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Abstract

This thesis explains how national media shape Indian foreign policy toward Pakistan. I
use empirical research to explore the contribution of national media to the formulation of
policy during the 1999 Kargil War and 2001 Agra Summit between India and Pakistan. I
created a database of news articles in the leading national English newspapers—The
Times of India and Hindustan Times and then coded and analyzed them. I analyze the
media’s role by identifying trends in media strategies such as framing, agenda setting,
and manufacturing consent. In addition, I analyze government documents and
parliamentary debates to gather information on the policy processes and on governmentmedia relations. I suggest that the media’s role in shaping policy depends on the level of
internal dissent, understood as disagreement between the government and the opposition
parties. I argue that national dissent allows the media to emerge as an independent actor,
influencing the formulation of foreign policy by presenting their own opinions and policy
suggestions. This was the case during the Agra Summit. On the other hand, as seen in the
case of the Kargil War, during times of national consensus, the media echo the
government’s voice and garner public support for the government’s actions. As such, this
thesis contributes to existing scholarship and primary fieldwork by providing an original
analysis of the intersection of media and foreign policy.
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Introduction

“We have to give credit to the media. They play a role in defining the atmosphere in
which India-Pakistan relations exist.” - Ambassador Cameron Munter (2016)

On December 16, 2012, the gangrape of an innocent girl1 galvanized the media
and public opinion, and generated a national debate. Both cable news and print media
offered non-stop coverage of the debate and of the widespread protests. The government
was forced to respond to the growing anxiety and public outrage, expressed across a wide
variety of media sources and outlets. In response, the government modified the Indian
Penal Code2, to incorporate stringent punitive measures for those accused of sexual
offences. This modification was a result of the combined effect of public outrage and
impactful journalism. In this case, the national media brought the nation together to
ensure that the government amend the law to reflect stronger measures of justice for
sexual offences. Here, investigative journalism brought to light the nation’s changing
societal norms. Along with the public, the media demanded legislative amendments and
played an important role in leading to policy change (Hukil 2013). The “Nirbhaya” case
is not the only testament to the media’s role in the formulation of policy in India. Another
important incident took place on February 2016, when the government indicted a student
of Jawaharlal Nehru College, Kanhaiya Kumari3 for sedition. At this time, news anchor

1

Popularly known as the “Nirbhaya” gangrappe case.

2

The changes to the penal code are reflected in the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act of 2013 that provides

more stringent justice measures for sexual offenders (The Indian Express).
3

This incident came to be known as the “JNU Row.” President of JNU students’ union, Kanhaiya Kumari,
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of the most watched English news channel TIMES NOW4, Arnab Goswami led the antinational lobby against JNU students. In doing so, Goswami drew the entire nation into a
debate on India’s sedition charges, engaging the government and the people in a
conversation about the country’s laws and legislative abilities (Mishra 2016; Ganguly
2016). Here, the media incited impactful debates on matters of national importance.
These cases have offered insight into the media’s role in shaping India’s domestic
policies.
While the national media’s role in domestic issues is documented and discussed,
their contribution to foreign policy is more complex and less researched. In this thesis, I
endeavor to tap into this lacuna, extending the research on the media’s role in policymaking from the domestic to foreign realm. I suggest that the news media help shape
foreign policy toward Pakistan, and argue that the nature of the media’s contribution is
dependent on the national political atmosphere. During times of internal dissent, the
media emerge as an independent actor, offering their opinions on the policy matter. On
the other hand, in cases of national consensus, the media echo the government’s voice
and garner public support for the government’s decisions. Here, it is crucial to note that
the media serve as the link between the public, government and opposition parties
(Soroka 2003, 29). This highlights the role of the media as the interlocutor without which
it would be difficult for the various actors to communicate with each other.

was arrested by the Indian government on sedition charges, based on his involvement on campus with a
demonstration to pay homage to the Kashmiri separatist Afzal Guru, who partook in the attack on the
Indian parliament in 2001. Kumari was charged as being anti-national (Sugden 2016).
4

Selected from 2016 week 47 listings of weekly impressions (Television Viewership in Thousands)

provided by Broadcast Audience Research Council India, http://www.barcindia.co.in/statistic.aspx.
Accessed on Dec. 3, 2016.
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As the most prominent form of mass communication within the country, the
media are able to determine the information that reaches the public, influencing their
consumption and perception of this information. Here, Baru notes that in this age of
information technology, broadcast media turn foreign policy matters into sensational
debates aired on national television that capture the attention of viewers and increase “the
role of media in shaping political thinking” (Baru 2009, 279). This points to the role of
the media as an arbitrator between the government and the people, emphasizing the
media’s crucial role within a democracy. This is especially important in the case of
foreign policy since most people are only able to gain access to information on these
matters through the media.
This thesis combines a review of existing scholarship with empirical analysis to
explore how national media shape Indian foreign policy toward Pakistan. To do so, I
analyze the media coverage, parliamentary debates, and government statements during
the India-Pakistan war of 1999 and the bilateral summit of 2001. I explain the rationale
for this selection in the “Research Methods” section of this chapter. Before that, I review
the literature on media strategies and role in a policy context, and on news media in India.
In the following chapter, I discuss the evolution of foreign policy in India, before
proceeding to empirical analysis of the selected cases. In this thesis, I explore the role of
the media, taking into account how this role is contingent on the degree of internal
dissent. This suggests that media both influence and are impacted by the political climate
of the nation. In this regard, I analyze how the media’s contribution varies depending on
the level of national discord on the issue.
I then look at how the media shape policy discussions through media strategies
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such as framing, agenda setting, and manufacturing consent. To briefly explain these
phenomena, the media uses the framing strategy to create “interpretive frames” (Gamson
and Wolfsfeld 1993), consequently using specific lenses, stereotypes, and symbols to
present news (Entman 1991). Further, the media use the agenda setting strategy to
determine the salience of issues on public and governmental agendas (McCombs & Shaw
1972); and the manufacturing consent strategy to artificially generate support for the elite
and the government (Chomsky and Herman 1988). I will discuss these strategies in detail
later in this chapter. This two-step method, based on the level of internal dissent5 and
media strategies, allows me to thoroughly examine the role of the media in the
formulation of foreign policy.
This foundation of internal disagreement warrants a brief discussion on the role of
dissent. Within this scope, dissent is understood as a clear expression of discontent or
disagreement with government policy as expressed by the opposition political parties. For
this thesis, I accept Matthew Baum and Philip Potter’s emphasis on opposition as the
“whistleblowers.” They present the opposition parties as “heterogeneous and autonomous
political elites in positions of power that have independent access to foreign policy
information and the incentive to reliably alter the public when their leaders stray too far
from their preferred policies” (Baum and Potter 2015, 21). In the Indian parliamentary
system, the opposition parties become privy to foreign policy information primarily
through debates in the houses of parliaments. These parties are then able to analyze
policies and express disagreement where necessary. I understand the opposition as the

5

I first developed this idea of media’s role as a function of internal dissent from Dr. Sanjaya Baru’s
research. Dr. Baru finds that the influence of media on the formulation of foreign policy depends on “the
extent of domestic political disagreement or consensus on foreign policy issues” (Baru 2009, 278). In this
thesis, I test this argument through empirical analysis.
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foremost expression of dissent, fulfilling its role to check the ruling government. For this
reason, I analyze parliamentary debates to note the reactions and concerns brought up by
the opposition. In addition, I acknowledge that this dissent then carries through society
and is represented in the voice of the people and the media. As such, I look at the
disagreement expressed in the media. In this regard, I see the opposition and the media as
the driving force for dissent. Pramit Pal Chaudhuri reiterated this understanding,
explaining that the media and the opposition often inform and follow each other’s take on
policy matters, especially when taking a stand against the government (Chaudhuri 2017).
In such cases where the opposition outrightly states discontent with a government
policy, it makes room for the media to contribute to policy formulation, as illustrated in
Baru’s focus on dissent as a crucial factor for media’s role (Baru 2009, 279). This
indicates that national media are able to arbitrate between opposing sides and stand as an
independent actor. However, their role is largely dependent on the nation’s political
atmosphere, owing to the level of national dissent. Baru identifies internal political
dissent as a crucial factor leading to a “turning point” in media’s role in foreign policy
making. In this regard, he offers the following reason: “the gradual erosion of the
domestic political consensus on foreign policy, [gives] the media the role of an arbiter
and independent analyst of contending political views” (Baru 2009, 279). This suggests
that the cases of national dissent and consensus are likely to have different outcomes.
Based on this understanding, it is important to analyze media strategies and roles in
conjunction with the varying levels of national disagreement. By placing media coverage
in tandem with government statements and policy discussions, I trace the role of the
media in the government’s foreign policy-making processes. The focus on national

Taneja

5

dissent is especially important in the case of India-Pakistan relations given that Pakistan
is as much a domestic matter as a foreign policy one (Pandalai 2017). Due to the history
of bloodshed and disagreement between the two nations, people in India take keen
interest in India-Pakistan affairs, therefore involving national sentiments (Pandalai 2017).
In order to understand these driving sentiments and their impact on media coverage and
bilateral relations, we must briefly explore the history of India-Pakistan relations.
India and Pakistan were jointly administered under British rule until 1947. It was
only after the end of British rule in 1947 that the two partitioned over religious feuds
between Hindus and Muslims causing an estimated three million deaths and 15 million
displacements (Malone 2011, 54). In 1971, East Pakistan separated from its Western
counterpart to form a new nation — Bangladesh. During the Bangladesh Liberation War,
India assisted in the formation of the separate nation, straining the already tense relations
between India and Pakistan (Pant 2016, 83-84). Since 1947, India and Pakistan have gone
to war four times; three of these wars were due to the territorial conflict over Kashmir
(Pant 2016, 82). This history of conflict has led to continual hostilities between the
countries, consequently sensitizing their bilateral foreign policy decisions. Rajiv Sikri
emphasizes the complexities of the relationship and distinguishes Pakistan from India’s
other neighbors by noting:
Pakistan is India’s most difficult neighbour and cannot be dealt with like India’s
other South Asian neighbours for a number of reasons -- its mindset; its strategic
significance for outside powers, nuclear and missile capabilities and its territorial
dispute with India over Kashmir. However, the most important difference
between Pakistan and India’s other neighbours is that for India the relationship
with Pakistan is as much a domestic as a foreign policy issue (2009, 38).
The special position of Pakistan makes bilateral relations a matter of national interest.
This is especially important since the public’s appetite for news is primarily for domestic
Taneja
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issues (Hook 2016, 270). Placing Pakistan within the realm of India’s domestic interests
speaks to the public’s attentiveness and discussions on matters of bilateral importance.
Baru highlights that news related to Pakistan always finds its way to the front page of
Indian newspapers (Baru 2009, 282). Thus, India-Pakistan affairs arouse national
discourse, allowing the media to capitalize on the public’s interest.
India boasts a vast news media network. Largely privatized, the media most often
play an important role by contributing to controversial domestic and international
matters. They do so by presenting a view independent of the government’s stand. This is
especially so in cases of national dissent, since internal disagreement creates a vacuum in
policy debates, making room for the media to enter the discourse. It is then important to
note that internal disagreement has been on the rise since Jawaharlal Nehru’s leadership
in India.
Over time, India has become more prone to internal dissent, especially in matters
of foreign policy. It can be said that “the largely consensual style of foreign policy has
been replaced by approaches that vary from being simply different, to being partisan and
ideological” (Malone et al. 2015). Sanjaya Baru reiterates this idea, finding that few
disagreed with the foreign policy of India’s first prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru. With
India’s non-aligned position during the Cold War, the national media and the public
accepted Nehru’s policies as acting in national interest. In this context, Baru highlights
that the media had a minimal role to play (Baru 2009). I will discuss this in detail in
chapter 1, which focuses on the evolution of Indian foreign policy. In the present
scenario, following the decline of this consensual era, that media play the role of an
“arbitrator” between the various actors (Malone et al. 2015, 6). This shift from domestic
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consensus to dissent has given the national media the opportunity to enter foreign policy
discussions. In this position, the media are able to help shape policy by expressing an
independent opinion, guiding public perception, and engaging with the government. The
collaborative role of the media and the opposition can be illustrated using the following
examples.
In times when the opposition and the government are in disagreement, the media
are able to emerge as an independent actor. In the time following the 2008 November 11
attacks in Mumbai (hereafter referred to as 26/11) there was national outrage against
Pakistani authorities that allowed proliferation and outsourcing of terror. At this time, a
series of events took place in which the media were an active player. In July 2009 after
the Non-aligned Movement6 summit in Egypt. Prime Minister Singh got caught in the
infamous Shark el-Sheikh incident for engaging in conversation with his counterpart in
Pakistan and discussing Balochistan7 despite the tremors of 26/11 in India. The leading
opposition, Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) denounced this by stating, “the waters of the
seven seas will not be able to wash the shame” that had come upon India by
“compromising” its position on Pakistan (Hindustan Times). Simultaneously, national
broadcast media debated on the topic “Is the PM facing nation’s trust deficit?” (quoted in
Pandalai 2013, 37). In this situation, the government and opposition were in clear
disagreement; consequently, the media were able to enter the discussion and analyze the

6

NAM was conceived during the Cold War to bring together states that did not align with any major

power. It was primarily a measure to ensure sovereignty and counter imperialism (Grant 1995).
7

Balochistan is a province is one of Pakistan’s four provinces. It is of strategic and economic importance

to the country. However, the recent years have seen a rise of Baloch nationalism, and Pakistan has been
blaming the Indian Intelligence for helping these nationalists. As such, it has been an issue of contention
between India and Pakistan (Nauman 2016).
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various arguments. Here, the media joined the opposition in taking a stand against
government actions (Malone et al. 2015). Headlines ranged from India Today’s
“Manmohan Singh’s Balochistan Blunder” (Bhushan 2009) to Hindu’s “Sell-out at
Sharm-el Sheikh.” These opinionated articles suggest that the media were able to offer
their own views and analysis of the incident, indicating that media emerged as an
independent and influential actor. Within this scope, South Asia researcher, Shruti
Pandalai underlines the media’s efforts to drive the government to take stringent action,
highlighting the nation’s rising anger at the government’s willingness to engage with
Pakistan (Pandalai 2013, 39). Resultantly, the media were able to elicit an explanation
from the leaders. Compelled to respond, Prime Minister Singh, on returning from Egypt,
said in the Parliament:
Despite the best of intentions, we cannot move forward if terrorist attacks
launched from Pakistani soil continue to kill and injure our citizens, here and
abroad. That is the national position and I stand by that. … I wish to reiterate that
the President and the PM of Pakistan know, after our recent meetings, that we can
have a meaningful dialogue with Pakistan only if they fulfil their commitment, in
letter and spirit, not to allow their territory to be used in any manner for terrorist
activities against India (Ministry of External Affairs 2009).
This suggests that Dr. Singh recognized the importance of responding to the questions
and concerns raised in national media. As such, the media coverage was able to get a
response directly for the government, encouraging the government to reconsider its
interaction with Pakistan. However, the media’s role is different during times of internal
consensus.
On the other hand, in times of consensus, such as in the case of the Sino-Indian
border dispute of 2009, the media did not play a significant role since there was domestic
agreement on the matter (Pandalai 2013). In this case, I note two contributing factors:
Taneja

9

India’s concrete policy toward China and a high level of internal consensus. Here, it is
important to acknowledge that since China and India have signed a number of treaties
regarding border issues, they follow standard operating procedures when an issue does
arise (Malone et al. 2013). This indicates that the border issue is governed by stringent,
cautious laws that leave little room for outside influence. In this situation, while
discussing government policy toward China, national media offered intermittent coverage
and mostly supported government action (Pandalai 2013, 59). Contrary to the case with
China, Indian policy toward Pakistan is ambivalent and lacks any clear structure or longterm strategy (Pant 2016, 13), creating a vacuum that then allows the media to help shape
the policy. This indicates that internal dissent makes room for the media to enter the
debate and contribute to policy, while national consensus encourages the media to lend
their support to government decisions. Based on this analysis, I present the following
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: News media emerge as a more important actor in cases of national dissent
than in cases of consensus.
Hypothesis 2: During times of internal consensus, the media garner public support for
government policy by echoing the government’s voice and reiterating its decisions.
In this thesis, I suggest that the contribution of national media to the formulation
of foreign policy is contingent on the level of domestic discord. When there is national
dissent, the media emerge as a crucial independent actor, arbitrating between the
government, opposition and public. In such situations, the media are able to shape policy
by presenting an independent stand, motivating the government to respond to their
concerns. On the other hand, in situations of domestic consensus, the media play an

Taneja 10

important role in drawing public support for government policy. In order to understand
this distinction better, it is important to explore the general debates on media and their
reporting strategies, detailed in the following section.

Media Strategies and Role in a Policy Context

To a large extent, the media’s role is determined by the political climate in the
nation. In some instances, the media serve as an independent actor voicing their own
opinion, while in others they reiterate the government’s stand. This indicates that the
media have the ability to function both in favor of and in opposition to the government.
As a result, the media have a hand in shaping foreign policy. Within this scope, one must
understand the intention of the media. Foreign editor of the Hindustan Times, Pramit Pal
Chaudhuri clarified that the newspapers assume that they do not have an impact by
themselves on government decisions. Rather, they understand an issue, comment on it,
take a stand when necessary, and then proceed to the latest news (Chaudhuri 2017). This
indicates that the media are not actively working toward an impact; rather, they are
presenting an independent view. Here, one must acknowledge that even within the media,
there exists a diversity of opinions — different news agencies offer different opinions and
analyzes. It is crucial to note that others disagree with this belief and argue that the media
report with the specific aim of influencing government decisions (Pandalai 2017; Healey
2017). Irrespective of the media’s intention, they are able to weigh in on foreign policy
debates as a result of the strategies described in this section.
Then, it is essential to consider how national leaders perceive information and
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opinions disseminated through the media. “Decision makers act upon and respond to
conditions and factors that exist outside them and the governmental organization of
which they are a part” (Synder et. al 2002, 60). National media act as one such actor that
draws a response from the government. In this context, media can act both as an internal
and external variable (Brecher 1972, 183-207). As for the internal role, Brecher
highlights media’s role as “the communication network within the political system”
(1972, 183-207). This reflects the mediation function of the media—as the arbitrator
between the government and the opposition. As an external variable, the media present
themselves as an input, influencing decisions of elites through agenda-setting and by
manufacturing consent (Synder et. al 2002). Here, they serve as an outside voice
analyzing policies and offering an independent view, as noted during times of internal
dissent. The internal and external roles of the media are not mutually exclusive. In most
situations, the media serve as the internal communication link and simultaneously carry
out their external role of analysis and influence. To carry out these functions, the media
use use three important strategies to contribute to policy discussions—agenda setting,
framing and manufacturing consent.
Agenda Setting
This strategy represents news media’s ability to determine the salience of issues
on the public agenda. Through this, the media are to serve as priming mechanism,
drawing the government’s attention to matters that are important to the public, and
priming them for the government’s focus and response. Bernard Cohen first discussed
agenda setting in The Press and Foreign Policy, stating, “The Press may not be
successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful

Taneja 12

in telling its readers what to think about” (Cohen 1965, 13). This suggests that the media
are able to direct the attention of the government and public to specific issues. McCombs
and Shaw (1972) then explained the agenda-setting theory during their study wherein
they studied the relation between issues covered by media and those that the public
considered salient during the 1968 presidential election in the United States. They
observed the matters that the media focused their coverage on, and then placed these in
context of the level of public interest in various issues, as determined by a range of
surveys. Finding that the public generally shared the media’s view of what is important,
they were able to emphasize the agenda-setting role of media (McCombs & Shaw 1972).
Chanan Naveh emphasizes that this representation of foreign policy events through the
media influences elite decision-makers to respond to the agenda items (Naveh 2002, 10).
In a personal interview, former US ambassador to Pakistan, Cameron Munter presented
the following view of decision-makers: “[the] role of press was very much on the mind of
the leaders. Leaders pay very close attention to what the news said” (Munter 2016). This
suggests that government decision-makers take note of the issues highlighted by the
press, reiterating the media’s agenda-setting role and their influence on the government.
This agenda-setting function of the media is prominent in the case of China’s
foreign policy. James Reilly highlights that by deciding news coverage of events and
reflecting nationalist opinions, news media play a role in setting the Chinese foreign
policy agenda, exerting pressure on the government to act urgently and carefully on these
matters (Reilly 2012, 40). Discussing the case of Chinese media coverage of protests in
China against the possibility of Japan’s seat in the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC), Wang and Wang observe the impact of the media that set the policy agenda,

Taneja 13

narrow policy options, create urgency and influence the final decision (Wang & Wang
2014, 216).
In the case of Indian media, I turn to the coverage of the 26/11 terror attacks in
Mumbai. Pandalai highlights that during this time, encouraging the government to act
urgently and pushing for severe measures against Pakistan, Indian media set out an array
of policies for the government, eventually playing an active role in influencing the
Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), by proposing that the government should consider
suspending talks with Pakistan and debate military strategy moving forward (Pandalai
2013, 41). While leading journalist of TIMES NOW, Arnab Goswami led a debate on the
option of a surgical strike in retaliation, titled “Will striking Pakistan solve things?”
(2008), CNN IBN’s discussion was called “Public anger against inaction. What are
India’s military options?” (2009). These debates that took place in the wake of the
incident suggest that the media began discussing options the government had not yet
proposed or confirmed. This indicates their agenda-setting role that allowed them to
suggest and encourage specific actions on the part of the government. My analysis of the
Agra Summit reaffirms this role of the media, revealing that the government was forced
to respond to the media’s concerns about discussions with Pakistan despite border
incursions. In addition, the government made note of and apologized for its lack of
engagement with the media during the summit. Debates on these issues took place during
the parliamentary sessions that followed the summit and referenced media coverage of
these setbacks confirm the agenda-setting role of the media. However, this is not the only
media strategy at play, the media also engage in frame the news stories to direct the
public and government’s interpretation of events.
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Framing
The strategy of “media framing” represents the lens or angle that news media
take to present a story. This gives the media the power to create “interpretive frames”
(Gamson and Wolfsfeld 1993), consequently using specific lenses, stereotypes and
symbols to present news (Entman 1991). This highlights that the media retain the power
to drive the interpretation and perception of incidents. Shanto Iyengar analyzed the role
of media framing in context of coverage of poverty in America. “Political issues are
defined primarily through news reports, and since news coverage is inevitably expressed
in particular frames, the influence of the media on public opinion can be significant,”
explained Iyengar (1991). This is especially important in the case of foreign policy news,
since the public does not have direct access to details of these events and thus learn about
them primarily through the media.
In this regard, Steven Hook explains that news agencies tend to frame coverage
on foreign policy issues to simplify the issue for the U.S. population (Hook 2016, 270).
Naveh understands this framing process as one through which the media “create the
images that reflect and filter reality” as part of the foreign policy dialogue (Naveh 2002,
8). While media agencies in every country may not take the same path, it appears that
media, by determining how to present information—whether by simplifying or creating a
particular image—retain the power to frame reality in a particular way. As such, they
choose how the message reaches the audiences. Here, it is important to reiterate that
depending on the circumstances, the media are able to present an independent voice or
serve as the mouthpiece of the government. On all accounts, they play the mediating role
between the government, opposition and the public. In the post-26/11 situation, it appears
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that the media were presenting public opinion in iterating that India was angry about the
government’s “inaction” (CNN-IBN), while simultaneously offering an independent
opinion through policy options. On the other hand, during the India-Pakistan war of 1999,
the media echoed the voice of the government (Singh 1999). These situations emphasize
that the media use myriad frames to present a story. This was evident in the empirical
analysis of both events I identified—Agra Summit and Kargil War. While the media took
an anti-government and an anti-Pakistan path during the Agra Summit, they reported on
Kargil by explicitly displaying Pakistan in negative light. The Kargil case was marked by
the media’s broad support for government action during the war, drawing public
affirmation for government decisions. This indicates that in most, if not all cases, the
media consciously choose a certain outlook and view with which they present a story. In
some situations, these frames are selected so as to garner support for elite decisions. This
is known as the “manufacturing consent” function of the media, described as follows.
Manufacturing Consent
This strategy focuses on the media’s inclination to stand in support of government
policy and elite institutions. Manufacturing consent was first presented by Noam
Chomsky and Edward Herman who note that “mass media of the United States are
effective and powerful ideological institutions that carry out a system-supportive
propaganda function” (Chomsky and Herman 1988, 306). Further, Piers Robison argues
that media are driven to represent and support the view of the executive and elite (the
government) — thus artificially manufacturing support for a particular policy (Robison
2001, 525). This suggests that the media do not always present an independent voice;
instead, under certain circumstances, the media act a government mouthpiece.
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In times of national consensus, one sees the media as the voice of the government
rather than the voice of the people as in the case of the Kargil war. I analyze the
situations under which this stands true. This thesis suggests that these are the conditions
that prompt the media to artificially manufacture public consent for government policy in
India. Owing to the rising dissent in the country, this role of the media has been in
decline. In the past, the media and public rarely disagreed with the foreign policy
presented by India’s first PM Nehru (Baru 2009). As understood by this research, the
media tend to manufacture consent when there is no dissent from the opposition, as was
the case in the Cold War era under Nehru. Through empirical analysis, I observed that
this strategy was also at play during the Kargil war when the media came together in
support of the government, promoting a nationalist rhetoric and focusing on an antiPakistan interpretive frame. In this way, the national media garnered national support for
government action in Pakistan. For further analysis of these strategies in the case of India,
it is essential to understand how national news media have evolved in the country.

News Media in India

Over the years, media in India have evolved as a significant part of the daily
dialogue on matters of importance. When discussing the evolution of media in India, it is
important to understand its privatization. The evolution of the media in India can be
divided into two phases: the first was from 1947 till 1991 when broadcast media was
controlled by the government, giving the government autonomy over all informational
revealed through the media. At this time, India had only one TV channel—state-run
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Doordarshan. In 1991, however, a range of private channels gained importance, leading
to the diminishing role of Doordarshan (Malone et. al 2010). So, the second phase of the
media came after the 1991 privatization and proliferation of broadcast media, when the
government lost its control (Malone et. al 2010). Today, India has more than 80 satellite
news channels (Thussu 2002, 208) and 14,000 newspapers (Registrar of Newspapers for
India). Then, in 1999, during the Kargil War between India and Pakistan, news channels
offered non-stop coverage of the war, setting in motion the CNN effect8. This highlights
the importance of news media in the country (Malone et. al 2010).
Privatization made for a new era of media coverage, presenting the media as an
actor independent of the government and giving them control over the information
presented to the public. Moreover, this has meant that the media the government are now
less likely to exert their influence on or try to sway media coverage (Baru 2009). In
addition, these private channels were considered more credible than Doordarshan in the
country as they are seen to represent independent voices (Thussu 2002, 208). Despite the
expansion of private media, India still ranks 133 on the 2016 World Press Freedom Index
due to the existing violence against journalists (Reporters Without Borders). Nonetheless,
the organization considers Indian media capable of carrying out its journalistic functions.
It finds that “although its [India’s] media are dynamic and much more capable of playing
the role of democracy’s watchdog than the media in most other countries in last third of
8

The following explains the CNN effect with regards to Western governments. With the vast media

network in India, the same understanding can be extended to the Indian case as well. “The causal
mechanism of the CNN effect is usually conceived in the following way: Media coverage (printed and
televised) of suffering and atrocities → journalists and opinion leaders demand that Western governments
'do something' → the (public) pressure becomes unbearable → Western governments do something”
(Jakobsen 2000, 132).

Taneja 18

the Index” (Reporters Without Borders 2016). This becomes evident in the case of
reporting on Pakistan. Since Pakistan presents a sensitive topic, given terrorism problems
and border disputes, reporting on these matters can be challenging; regardless, the Indian
media raise a voice of dissent and openly discuss these matters. For instance, in a recent
case, reporter Arnab Goswami was threatened by a Pakistani terror group due to his
coverage of border skirmishes; the government then allotted personal security for Arnab
(The Indian Express 2016). Thus, despite the low ranking and violence against
journalists, Indian media are reporting on sensitive matters, carrying out their journalistic
duties, and expressing their independent voice, even on sensitive foreign policy matters
such as issues relating to Pakistan.

Research Methods and Case Studies

In this thesis, I explore how national media shape Indian foreign policy toward
Pakistan. I analyze this in context of the national political atmosphere—the level of
internal dissent. To measure the extent of dissent, I focus on the statements made by the
opposition in the parliament and on dissent expressed in the news media. In addition, I
examine the effect of the various media strategies that I have discussed in this chapter.
For this, I looked closely at media coverage, parliamentary debates and government
statements during two major events in India-Pakistan relations—the Kargil War and the
Agra Summit. For the media coverage, I focused on articles in the The Times of India and
the Hindustan Times, India’s leading English-language newspapers. In this section, I
explain the rationale for my case selection and the methods I use to carry out my analysis.
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Identified Cases for Analysis
I identify the following important events for analysis:
1. 1999: Kargil War along the Line of Control (LoC)
2. 2001: India-Pakistan Agra Summit
These cases—a war and a bilateral summit—have been strategically selected to
represent two crucial aspects of the India-Pakistan relationship and challenges to
reconciliation. In 1999, India and Pakistan engaged in their last bilateral war; this war
was fought in the Kargil district of the conflicted region of Jammu & Kashmir after
Pakistani troops crossed the Line of Control (LoC) to enter India. It came to be known as
the Kargil War (Chen 2015). This is a particularly important war for media analysis since
it was the first time that privatized broadcast media in India offered full-time coverage of
the events (Malone et. al 2010; Thussu 2002, 208). As such, it lends itself for scrutiny for
media analysis.
Following this war, an India-Pakistan summit took place in Agra in 2001 with the
mission of discussing long-standing issues between the countries and working toward
their resolution. This was a historic event between the two as they sought to strengthen
bilateral ties. However, the peace talks were not successful and the leaders did not sign
any treaty (Chaudhuri 2016) . Ambassador Nirupama Rao, the then spokesperson for the
Ministry of External Affairs of India, identified the media’s role in the failure of these
talks. She held that the media responsible for sensationalising the subject matter of the
negotiations, especially with regards to Kashmir, and found that the media prevented
resolution and normalization of India-Pakistan affairs (Rao 2016). Hence, this summit is
especially important in the history of bilateral relations and for media analysis, as
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political leaders held the media responsible for driving the nations to an impasse and
preventing normalization.
These two events have been pivotal moments in India-Pakistan relations—the
latest war and then an attempt to reconcile. While there have been border skirmishes
since, these have not been of the scale or consequence as the mentioned cross-border war.
As for the present moment, India and Pakistan have been involved in serious border
conflict in 2016, following death of Burhan Wani in July 2016, a renowned separatist
leader in Kashmir. However, since these events are ongoing and are constantly marked
by changing policies and decisions, it is difficult to analyze them accurately. Thus, this
thesis covers the time period from 1999 to 2001, leaving room for analysis of more
current events once final decisions are made.
Methodology
This thesis consists of two sections—literature review and empirical analysis. The
former presents an analysis of the existing scholarship on the Indian foreign policy,
media strategies and their intersection. It also contains detailed evaluations of IndiaPakistan relations and of the Kargil war and the Agra Summit. The empirical analysis
tests the validity of the hypotheses present for these specific cases. It is divided into three
parts: (1) coding of news articles, government statements and parliamentary debates to
understand trends in the reporting, (2) evaluation of news reporting in context of the
series of events and government decisions, and (3) interviews with top-thinkers in the
field.
For each case, I first consolidated all information on the incident to construct a
detailed frame of reference of the real-time events. I then placed this in historical context.
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For the Kargil War, I analyzed former India-Pakistan wars and the history of the
demarcation of national borders. For the Agra summit, I placed the events in context of
previous attempts to strengthen bilateral relations. Further, personal interviews with
renowned journalists, researchers and government officials supplemented the information
gained from secondary research sources. Following this, I used the empirical analysis to
estimate the level of internal discord surrounding the incident in India—consensus or
dissent. Having understood the domestic climate, I scrutinized media strategies including
framing, agenda setting and manufacturing consent9 for each event, analyzing how they
work in relation to the level of national dissent. Based on this, I drew conclusions about
the contribution of national media in various circumstances.
Coding
I coded a range of materials including newspaper articles, government statements
and parliamentary debates. This allowed me to identify and examine trends in the media’s
coverage of these events. In order to code the data, I separated the articles into seven
categories for the Kargil War—Consensus, Dissent, Government Mention of Media,
Agenda Setting, Media Framing, Unbiased News, and Anti-Pakistan. I explain these
categories in detail in chapter 2 and 3 that focus on the empirical analysis of these events.
This process consolidated various references and helped me identify trends in reporting.
This made for both qualitative analysis drawing from content of the articles and
quantitative conclusions based on statistical findings that were derived from the number
of references.
I analyzed content from the leading national English-language newspapers. I

9

These terms are explained on page 2 of this thesis.
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chose to focus on newspapers for two main reasons — relationship with the government
and access to resources. As for government-media relations, I turn to Chaudhuri’s
justification who explains that the credibility of a story depends on the print media. He
finds that broadcast media retain the advantage of a shorter news cycle, allowing them to
raise issues; however, the story gains credibility only when the print backs it the
following morning. If the press chooses not to support a story, then the news dies out.
Here, he emphasizes that the government is aware of the print’s credibility. As a result,
government leaders engage more with members of the print media than with broadcast
journalists10 (Chaudhuri 2016). This highlights the importance of the print media,
especially with their longer news cycle that allows them to determine credibility of a
story by rigorously checking facts, an aspect that is crucial for a subject as intricate and
complex as foreign policy. Further, I chose to analyze English-language newspapers
since foreign policy is broadly accepted as an elite discourse. Chaudhuri highlights that
the broader mass of the population is only concerned that India is not humiliated, without
having any real understanding of what national interest is. Here, he emphasizes that the
government rely on the English media for their news, giving them more power to shape
policy than the media in vernacular languages (Chaudhuri 2016). As such, it is viable to
focus on the English press since most elites in India are among the English-speaking
society. This is evident even in the case of the Kargil War since the media focused on
building consensus among the elites of the country at this time, since these were the
people who had the ability to influence foreign policy (Seshu 1999). So, even if the
10

Chaudhuri draws from his experience as a long-term journalist and from his frequent interactions with

the prime minister’s office. He confirmed that government officials had informed him that leaders are more
likely to talk to print media about foreign policy matters.
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masses are interested in India-Pakistan affairs, the understanding and influence lies
primarily with English-speaking elites (Baru 2009, 281). As for the access to resources,
since my research dates back to 1999, it is difficult to procure news channel shows from
the time. On the other hand, I was able to access to print coverage of the events from
online archives and from the Indian Parliament Library. For my coding, I used articles
from the following English-language newspapers with the largest audience11 :
The Times of India (highest readership – 7.6 million)
Hindustan Times (second highest readership - 4.5 million)
I coded 112 articles on the Agra Summit and 13 articles on the Kargil war. These
were selected from online newspaper archives of Times of India (TOI) and Hindustan
Times (HT) that date back to 2000. In addition, I procured materials from the archives of
the press clippings department of the Indian Parliament Library. Through the library, I
procured files on the various events I covered that include clippings on the real-time
coverage of these incidents from various newspapers. These folders are especially
important since they are used to brief the decision-makers on the issue. Thus, these are
the news articles that most parliamentarians would get their information on the event
from. I analyzed all the articles from TOI and HT in these files. This covers the duration
of the event and post-event reactions. The selection includes opinion pieces, news articles
and a few editorials. Here, it is important to note that there were significantly lower
number of articles for the Kargil case due to limited access. While I analyzed all articles
available in the parliament library compilation, I could not use articles from online
newspaper archives since these only date back to 2000. Nevertheless, there were certain
11

Selected from from Indian Readership Survey 2014, taking into account language, circulation, and sales

Language wise certified circulation figures for the audit period Jan-Jun 2016.
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trends visible from these articles, supplemented and confirmed by government statements
and parliamentary debates.
As mentioned earlier, I coded the content of these articles into various categories
and then placed these findings in context of real-time events and government decisions.
Real-time Events: Contextualizing the findings
In addition to the news articles, I analyzed parliamentary debates from the
sessions immediately following the incidents to identify trends in opposition questions
and in the government’s defense of its actions. This was especially important to note
when and in what context the decision-makers make references to the media and its
coverage within policy debates.
Further, I took into account government statements and press releases including
speeches by the prime minister and minister of external affairs, offering insight into the
interaction between the government’s perception of the event and of the media’s
contribution to it. In case of the Kargil War, this also included the report prepared by the
Kargil Review Committee, a board constituted by the Indian government to review and
study the faults during the war. I used these resources to analyze the detailed series of
real-time events and the media’s coverage in context of government decisions. Thus,
these strengthened the analysis by creating a broader and more concrete framework for
media analysis. This was then supported by information from personal interviews with
top-thinkers.
Personal Interviews
In addition to analysis of primary and secondary materials, I supported my empirical
analysis with information from personal interviews with leading journalists, scholars and
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government officials, both national and international. The following is a list of the
interviewees:
1.

Ambassador Nirupama Rao: Former Indian Minister of External Affairs, former
Spokesperson for the Ministry of External Affairs

2. Ambassador Cameron Munter: CEO of the EastWest Institute (international nonprofit think tank) and former U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan
3. Pramit Pal Chaudhuri: Foreign Editor at Hindustan Times, Senior Associate and
Head of the India division of the Rhodium Group (Global Policy Consulting), and
former Board Member of India’s National Security Advisory Board
4. Bhaskar Hegde: Chief of Bureau, Deccan Herald, Bangalore
5. Jon Healey: Deputy Editorial Page Editor, Los Angeles Times
6. Shashank Bengali: South Asia Bureau Chief, Los Angeles Times
7. Shruti Pandalai: Associate Fellow at the Indian Institute for Defence Studies and
Analysis. with expertise in Media and Strategic Communication
8. Smruti Pattanaik: Senior Research Fellow at the Indian Institute for Defence
Studies and Analysis, with expertise in India’s neighbourhood policy, and author
of “Elite Perceptions in Foreign Policy: Role of Print Media in Influencing India
Pakistan Relations, 1989-1999”
9.

Dr. Rina Kashyap: Associate Professor and Chair in the Department of Political
Science, Lady Shri Ram College, New Delhi, specializing in Indian politics and
international relations

10. Meenakshi Ganguly: South Asia Director, Human Rights Watch
The interviewees, with their notable experience and varying backgrounds, offered
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valuable insights to guide, support and strengthen my findings. Along with the coding of
newspaper articles, and analysis of government documents and parliamentary debates, the
interviews make for a comprehensive empirical research.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have provided the framework for analysis through a discussion
on the global discourse on media strategies in relation to public policy. Given the various
factors acting in a country—from electoral motivation to the influence of the elites—it is
difficult to completely isolate the effect of the media. However, given the rising
importance of public opinion and the expansion of the network of media, it is crucial to
analyze the contribution of the media to foreign policy by understanding the media in
context of the other actors. There is a growing body of scholarship on media strategies
and one on the influence of public opinion on foreign policy. However, there is a lack of
research on the intersection of foreign policy and media, especially in South Asian
studies. This thesis seeks to fill this vacuum by presenting a case study-based analysis of
the contribution of media to Indian foreign policy. In the following chapters, I present my
empirical research. I begin by looking at the evolution of Indian foreign policy in context
of public opinion, and then present detailed analysis of the role of the media during the
Agra Summit and the Kargil War. I suggest that the media emerge as an independent
actor in case of national dissent as seen during the Agra Summit, and as a public supportsystem for the government in times of national consensus as seen in Kargil.
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Chapter 1
Foreign Policy in India: Theory and Evolution

Public Opinion and the Media in Foreign Policy Theories

Foreign policy is often differentiated from other policies that govern a country
due to the exclusive way in which it combines national interests with national security.
Bernard Cohen captures this emphasis on foreign policy by finding that these concerns of
“national interests, rather than special interests, and more fundamental values,” and make
foreign policy “more important than other domestic policies of a nation (Cohen, 1968,
530). This distinguishes foreign policy from other policy areas, especially in context of
the influence of outside factors such as the media and public opinion. Decision-making
elites then hold that foreign policy is beyond the realm of “democratic control and public
scrutiny” (Peters and Pierre 2005, 341). Since the national media serve as the link
between the government and the public, they are restricted by democratic constraints. To
this end, foreign policy elites would consider the media outside the influential factors in
policy-making processes, since they work within national boundaries.
While there is a range of scholarly work on the connection between public
opinion and foreign policy, that on media and foreign policy is still limited, especially in
South Asia. My thesis seeks to fill this vacuum of information by tracking the role that
the media have played in important foreign policy decisions. This section will discuss the
dominant strands of foreign policy theories and the influence of public opinion on foreign
policy. It will then place these theories in context of the Indian case. Drawing from
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existing scholarly works, I suggest that public opinion plays an important role in foreign
policy decisions. Based on this theoretical analysis, I argue that as the link between the
public and the decision makers, the media emerge as an important mediating actor in the
discourse on foreign policy.
Foreign policy theory is severely restricted by the conflicting arguments that have
persisted through the years. Commenting on this chaos in foreign policy studies, Jame
Rosenau found that “foreign policy analysis is devoid of general theory” (Rosenau 2011,
145). Nonetheless, I will try to briefly explain the opposing strands of policy arguments
that are relevant to this research. Walter Carlsnaes presents two opposing views of
leading thinkers in the field: the realist and the behavioralist.The two offer fundamentally
different views of the formulation of foreign policy. While foreign policy realists,
pioneered by Hans Morgenthau focus on the definitive actions by states as the basis for
policy, the behavioralist thinkers approach the argument from the lens of the “discrete
acts of ‘behavior.” Within this behavioralist view, the ‘vote’ becomes the “fundamental
unit of analysis,” driving the decisions made by foreign policy elites (Carlsnaes 2012,
432-434). This argument suggests that policy-makers work toward gaining public votes,
and this ambition guides their foreign policy related decisions. These arguments reiterate
the starkly different understandings of policy-making that exist within scholars studying
inter-state affairs. However, this isn’t the only dimension of difference. A second
difference analyzes the influence of domestic factors on the formulation of foreign
policy. In this case, Carlsnaes also divides the traditions of foreign policy theories into
Innepolitik and Realpolitik. Innepolitik implies that foreign policy is dependent on a
range of domestic factors. Editor of Foreign Affairs magazine and member of the Council
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of Foreign Relations, Gideon Rose supported this analysis of the influence of domestic
factors by stating that there “are many variants of this approach, each favouring a
different specific domestic independent variable ... they all share a common assumption –
that foreign policy is best understood as the product of a country's internal dynamics”
(Rose 1998, 148). On the other hand, believers of Realpolitik disagree with this analysis
and suggest instead that foreign policy is determined by “material systemic-level factors,”
such as geopolitics and interstate relations (Carlsnaes 2012, 434-435). Thus, while
Innepolitik supporters view foreign policy as flexible given its dependence on internal
political and nonpolitical factors, supporters of the Realpolitik offer a more rigid
perception of the policy-making process. Within this scope, it is the Innepolitik and
behavioralist strands of belief that recognize the role of national media and the public in
shaping foreign policy. Accepting the media as the segway between decision-makers and
the public, this argument can be further understood in context of the scholarship that links
foreign policy with public opinion.
To understand the current scholarship on public opinion and foreign policy, one
must engage with both the realist and liberal democratic perspectives. These present the
dominant debate on the topic (Holsti 1992, 440). Realists view public opinion as a
“barrier to thoughtful and coherent diplomacy, hindering efforts to promote national
interests that transcend the moods and passions of the moment” (Holsti 1992, 440). This
captures the realist understanding of public opinion and foreign policy as an intersection
between the emotional and rational. However, liberal democrats adopt a starkly different
view of the situation, finding that foreign policy is made more “peaceful” because public
involvement is able to constrain government action (Holsti 1992, 440). Thus, public
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opinion finds a more dominant space within the liberal democratic take on foreign policy
that acknowledges the power of the voice of the people in a democratic setting.
It is then important to consider and evaluate consistency in public opinion.
Following World War II, the Almond-Lippmann consensus declared that public opinion
is unsuited for foreign policy decisions due to its “volatile and irrational” nature (Holsti
1992, 442). However, many scholars have challenged this consensus in recent years,
laying emphasis on the contribution of public opinion. Among them, professors Benjamin
Page and Robert Shapiro carried out an extensive survey with 6,000 questions to test the
public’s vulnerability to inconsistent decision-making. Contrary to former assumptions,
they found that public opinion is fairly stable and rational on both domestic and foreign
policy matters (Page and Shapiro 1998). In addition to this study, a broad range of
scholarship since the 1970s suggests that public opinion is stable and reasonable, and
acknowledges its impact on foreign policy decisions (Soroka 2003, 27). However, this
stability does not indicate that the public is well-informed about matters of national
importance, such as treaties and interstate relations. Nonetheless, this lack of information
does not preclude them from contributing to the discourse or from maintaining a stable
position (Holsti 1992, 447-449). In a personal interview, South Asia Bureau Chief of the
Los Angeles Times, Shashank Bengali put the importance of public opinion into
perspective in the case of India. Bengali highlighted that the current government in India,
under the leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, has been adept at controlling the
message reaching the public. As a result, he has thus been able to garner public support
for the nation’s foreign policy decisions, leaving little room for the media to dominate the
public’s access to information on such issues (Bengali 2017). Here, Bengali emphasizes
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that public support is central to government decisions in this realm, since the government
focuses on managing the information that reaches the public and seeks comfort in
national support. While there is extensive research on the link between public opinion
and the government, this research often omits the role of the media, which is what I aim
to analyze in this thesis.
Over the years, few have commented on how the media moderates the discussion
between the government and the nation on matters of foreign policy. As previously
mentioned, former Ambassador Munter highlighted that the media are as an important
source of information for the leaders of a nation who are concerned with the reports
presented in the media. Professor Stuart Soroka reiterated this role of the media, stating:
Mass media content is the most likely source of over-time changes in individuals’
foreign policy preferences. On one hand, the mass media are the primary conduit
between the public and policymakers. Policymakers follow media reports on
public opinion, and the media are the public’s chief source of information on what
policymakers are doing. In addition, the media are the principal means by which
the vast majority of individuals receive information about foreign affairs, an issue
for which personal experience is unlikely to provide much useful information
(Soroka 2003, 28).
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Figure 1: National media’s bidirectional impact
Establishing this crucial link between the media, the people and the government
allows us to understand that the media play a double role, informing both the government
and the people. In this way, the media are pivotal to the influence of public opinion on
foreign policy decisions. This leads us to the major media strategies previously detailed:
agenda setting, framing, and manufacturing consent12. Soroka highlights that these media
studies have rarely been analyzed in tandem with foreign policy decisions (Soroka 2003,
29), as this research endeavors to do. However, some studies have indicated important
links between the two, suggesting the influence of these media strategies on decision-

12

For definitions, refer to the introduction.
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makers and on public opinion. Such research has suggested that “by calling attention to
some matters while ignoring others, television [or print] news influences the standards by
which governments, presidents, policies, and candidates for public office are judged”
(Iyengar and Kinder 1987, 63). It is important to note that decisions related to foreign
affairs are outside the realm of immediate tangibility for the common man, since most of
these decisions do not directly affect everyday lives of citizens, as suggested by Soroka
(2003, 29). This makes the media’s role more important as an informant for the public.
However, as is evident from this discussion, different strands of foreign policy connect
differently with the role of public opinion and the media. Therefore, it is crucial to
investigate the dynamics of the making of foreign policy within a country to be able to
understand how the public and the media fit within this context. In the following section,
I do this for the case of Indian foreign policy.

Evolution of Indian Foreign Policy

Seven decades after independence, Indian foreign policy still lies on the
foundation of an ambiguous framework lacking long-term strategy. Professor of
International Relations, Harsh Pant finds that “A nation’s foreign policy flows from
several sources: from the international system to its domestic political imperatives to the
cultural factors that underlie its society to the personal characteristics and perceptions of
individual decision-makers” (Pant 2016, 3). The existence and influence of these factors
is evident in the case of India. These various determinants have led to a situation in which
India has struggled to identify its national interests that could then guide its foreign policy
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(Pant 2016, 4). This lack of strategy, along with an inability to use military force
effectively, has prevented India from achieving its potential as a global power (Pant
2016, 8-9). As such, India has failed to formulate a concrete foreign policy to guide its
relations with international actors impacting its relations with other nations.
This incoherent structure of foreign policy has caused fluctuations in India’s
international approach and interactions over the years. Ganguly and Pardesi identify three
distinct phases of Indian foreign policy: the Nehruvian era from 1947-1962, the time
following the defeat by China from 1962-1991, and the post-Cold War phase from 1991
(Ganguly and Pardesi 2009, 4). One may safely add the latest Modi era of foreign policy,
beginning in 2014, to this list (Bengali 2017; Pandalai 2017). Immediately following
independence, much of India’s foreign policy was determined by its first prime minister,
Jawaharlal Nehru who sought to distinguish the nation’s policy from that of its colonial
rulers (Pant 2016, 4; Ganguly and Pardesi 2009, 5). With this, Nehru came to be known
as the “architect of Indian foreign policy” (Ganguly and Pardesi 2009, 5). During this
time, Nehru made a conscious effort to separate diplomatic and political decisions from
ones related to the military. He remained reluctant with regards to military spending,
weakening India’s power to defend itself. Simultaneously, with the tensions of the Cold
War peaking, Nehru drove India to join other third world countries in the Non-Aligned
Movement (NAM), reiterating India’s culture of national autonomy in decision-making
(Pant 2016, 3). However, this non-militaristic framework for policy lasted only till the
battle with China in 1962 (Ganguly and Pardesi 2009), following which India
reconsidered the links between the military and foreign policy.
The 1962 war marked the beginning of the second era of foreign policy for India
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that better integrated foreign and military policies. Pant observes the defeat at the hands
of China as the point at which India’s realized that “divorcing foreign policy from
military policy was a recipe for disaster” (Pant 2016, 9). This war marked the end of
Nehruvian politics. The following phase of foreign policy was marked by two major
events: India’s first nuclear weapon and the India’s role in the creation of Bangladesh. As
for the former, India tested its first nuclear weapon in what came to be known as the
“Peaceful Nuclear Explosion” of 1974 (Pant 2016, 6). A few years before that, Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi considered using military force to free Bangladesh from Pakistan.
India also reached out to the Soviet Union for support during the Bangladesh Liberation
War of 1971, leading to the creation of Bangladesh (Pant 2016, 5). Thus, this phase
witnessed a closer relation between the foreign and military strategies of India. Later,
with the end of the Cold War in 1991, India foreign policy took another turn toward
pragmatism (Pant 2016, 4). Even as India entered its third foreign policy era, it continued
to remain ambiguous about its objectives.
In 1999, Indian National Congress (INC) domination over Indian politics came to
an end with the rise of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) led by the Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP).With this, the BJP set up the National Security Council (NSC) in 1999
to advise the government on foreign policy matters. However, institutionalization of
policy-making was still limited and the NSC offered suggestions without consulting the
Cabinet Committee on Security, strategic policy groups or the National Security
Advisory Board (Pant 2016, 11). This indicates that the institutions only existed as
symbolic structures with little influence on policy decisions. As such, they were unable to
formalize the system of policy-making or lead to any long-term strategy for India. Thus,
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despite the various phases of foreign policy under two different governments, India
continued to lack a concrete structure or long-term strategy for its policy. Chaudhuri
reiterated this lack of planning, emphasizing that NSAB works on putting together longterm strategies for India that serve a limited function in a country that works on a
structure of ad hoc policy-making (Chaudhuri 2016). Thus, the latest chapter of foreign
policy under Modi launched within this obscure, short-term framework.
In the latest phase, since the rise of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the
government has tried to dismantle the legacy of non-alignment, reinvigorate regional
discourse, and develop stronger ties with the U.S., Australia and Japan, among others.
This new phase of foreign policy under Narendra Modi is often referred to as the “Modi
Doctrine” (Hall 2015). This suggests another significant shift in the policy structure of
the country. Such discussions on and changes to foreign policy strategy are subject to the
increasing disagreement among the political actors in the nation.
With its multi-party framework, the Indian political system is made of strong
opposition parties constantly questioning and disagreeing with policies established by the
incumbent government. Pant notes the existence of discord on policy matters, stating,
“For long, there has been a myth propagated by the political elites in the country that
there has been a general consensus across political parties on major foreign policy issues”
(Pant 2016,11). This reiterates the idea that agreement on such matters is a “myth,”
calling attention to the increasing discord within political leaders on matters of foreign
policy. Sanjaya Baru reaffirms this in his understanding of the growing trend of dissent
within India; Baru notes that while Nehruvian foreign policy was marked by broad
consensus in the government, the following years have witnessed increasing
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disagreement and opposition (Baru 2009). Pant emphasizes that the BJP has brought a
new Hindu-focused voice within the realm of Indian foreign policy, significantly
different from that of the INC (Pant 2016, 12). Further, Pant notes that the only policy
matter that has been received with consensus across the country is the national stand on
nuclear powers and the joint agreement to give up India’s nuclear status only in case of a
global disarmament (Pant 2016, 6). This lack of consensus has also restricted progress of
India’s relations with its neighboring countries.
India, as the leading power in South Asia, has failed to establish its role within the
region. Sikri highlights that boundaries in South Asia are colonial demarcations rather
than natural ones, leading to intensified cultural differences in the region and a past of
violence and bloodshed (Sikri 2009, 18-21). Within this tense atmosphere, the South
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was unable to establish itself as a
powerful organization for regional progress and cooperation (Sikri 2009, 25). Due to the
inadequacy of SAARC and the severe tensions in the region, policy dynamics in South
Asia are unstable. Within this scope, the instability of India-Pakistan relations has
repercussions for the security of the broader South Asian region (Sikri 2009, 38). Thus, it
is crucial to discuss India’s foreign policy toward Pakistan.
Pakistan presents the greatest challenge to Indian policy makers, especially due to
the territorial issue of Kashmir that has long been a problem for bilateral relations (Sikri
2009, 28; Pant 2016, 4). Here, Pant notes that in addition to a lack of domestic consensus
on the Kashmir issue within India, the two countries have significantly different
approaches to peace reconciliation Harsh Pant observes these differences in stating, “At
its foundation, these are irreconcilable differences and no confidence-building measures
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are likely to alter this situation … (they have) different strategies for peace” (Pant 2016,
91). Sikri reiterated this view by acknowledging that Pakistan does not yet have a solid
democratic structure, making it difficult to reach a solution to the Kashmir issue (Pant
2016, 25). In this situation where both countries have nuclear abilities, wars are avoided
and limited by nuclear deterrence (Sikri 2009, 47). Sikri and Pant agree that India needs
internal political consensus to approach the challenge of Pakistan with any success (Pant
2016, 25; Sikri 2009, 44). However, the current state of affairs within and between the
two countries prevents such reconciliation. It is then apt to end this discussion on the
evolution of Indian foreign policy and the lacuna of strategic culture with the following
quote: “India does not have a foreign policy. Period” (Pant 2016, 13). Here, I return to the
the role of the media, noting that the lack of a concrete foreign policy, as in the case of
India, makes way for the media to contribute to these discussions. Former UN SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan highlighted the inverse relation between policy and media influence,
explaining that the media are able to have a stronger impact when government policy is
not stringent or clear, since this ambiguity in policy makes room for the media to
maneuver government decisions (quoted in Hook 2008, 305). This lack of concrete policy
allows for an analysis of media’s contribution to India’s policy decisions on a case-bycase basis and calls for a historic exploration of India’s relations with Pakistan.
Owing to historical conflicts, India-Pakistan relations are exceptionally
problematic. They involve public sensitivities and thus invoke widespread national
interest. That said, Pakistan-related topics lead to non-stop media coverage and front page
news (Baru 2009, 278). Thus, in this case, the media play an important role. Based on
this, India-Pakistan is a crucial test-case for the role of media in the formulation of
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foreign policy. This case allows us to test the applicability of general foreign policy and
media theories in India. However, to understand the media’s contribution to foreign
policy, it is necessary to be familiar with the details of bilateral relations that form the
foundation on which the role of the media is carried out.

Bilateral Relations with Pakistan

Interstate dynamics within South Asia are strained by the strife-ridden IndiaPakistan relations. In this section, I explore the bilateral relations between India and
Pakistan, and their broader implications for South Asia. Noting that the events that I have
identified the Kargil War and the Agra Summit for empirical analysis in this thesis, I
delineate the history of cross-border confrontations and diplomatic negotiations between
the nations in this section. Within this scope, it is important to begin by acknowledging
that India is the most powerful nation in South Asia and faces the specific challenge of
maintaining peace and cooperation in the region (Sikri 2009). However, over time,
neighboring countries have begun to see India as a threat rather than an opportunity for
growth (Malone 2011, 105). Pakistan, India’s neighbour in the North-West, has long
harbored a hostile perception of India. Further, David Malone highlights that IndiaPakistan relations have been “fraught” since independence from British rule (Malone
2011, 107). On this, Stephen Cohen cites the words of G. Parthasarathy, former advisor
to Indira Gandhi, stating that “India-Pakistan reconciliation is like trying to treat two
patients whose only disease is an allergy to each other” (Cohen 2004, 61). To gain an indepth understanding of this current situation, it is essential to explore the historical
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relations of these countries.
As previously mentioned, India and Pakistan have been at war with each other
four times since their partition in 1947. The first India-Pakistan war was fought soon after
the 1947 partition, over the territory of Kashmir in the northern region of India. The
conflict was brought on by Pakistani military invaders who entered the region of
Muzaffarabad in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) on October 22, 1947, and then found their
way to Srinagar, the capital of Kashmir. Although this was before J&K officially ceded to
the Republic of India, Maharaja Hari Singh reached out to the Indian government for
assistance. Despite aid from India, the military was unable to free the region following
infiltration and the conflict continued into 1948. On January 1, 1948, the United Nations
(UN) stepped in to mediate the war, and eventually ended hostilities (Ganguly 1995,
171). This became the most prolonged India-Pakistan, war resulting in approximately
1500 military casualties (Singer and Small 1972, 75). Following this war, the UN
established the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) in United
Nations Security Council Resolution 29 on January 20, 1948 to mediate the conflict
through a “ceasefire, truce agreement and plebiscite” (Rao 2016, 107). This was the first
war fought over Kashmir. It lay the foundation for the conflicts that followed.
Almost 20 years later, in 1965, India and Pakistan went to war over Kashmir once
again. On August 5, 1965, Pakistani soldiers crossed the UN-established cease-fire line
(CFL) between the two countries in an attempt to seize Kashmir. The people of Kashmir
informed the Indian government of the incursion and cross-border action continued as
India tried to push back the Pakistani troops. On September 20, when they reached a
deadlock, the UNSC passed a cease-fire resolution. Following this, the countries engaged
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in bilateral talks in Tashkent, Soviet Union in January 1966 and India ceded a portion of
its territory in Kashmir to Pakistan (Ganguly 1995, 173).

Current
Borders

India’s
Claim

Pakistan’s
Claim

Source: The Economist: Fantasy Frontiers
Image 1: India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir
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The third war followed in 1971, when East Pakistan separated from its Western
counterpart to form a new nation — Bangladesh. This was the first war that was not
directly linked to Kashmir (Pant 2016, 83). During the Bangladesh Liberation War, India
supported the formation of the separate land. This further strained India-Pakistan
relations (Palit 1972, 36). Bengali East Pakistanis felt isolated by the larger nation in the
West, calling for independence and leading to large-scale exodus of eastern Pakistanis
into India. As a result, India considered engaging in military action in support of
Bangladesh. At this time, West Pakistan launched pre-emptive strikes against India. This
led to a war between the two countries, resulting in the loss of 10,000 lives and the
creation of Bangladesh (Pant 2016, 83-84). Following this war, Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi met her counterpart Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan to reach the political decision
that the nations would keep the newly acquired land and sketch a new territorial
demarcation. This came to be known as the Line of Control (LoC) and was embedded in
the bilateral Simla Agreement (Kargil Review Committee 1999, 2.46). The LoC
encouraged military personnel to stay within their territory. Yet, Pakistan is still in search
of ‘revenge’ for India’s role in 1971, continuing its aggression and hostility toward India
(Sikri 2009, 39). This became evident when the agreement collapsed in 1999 with
Pakistani incursions into Kargil (Rao 2016, 114). Less than three decades later, Pakistan
expressed its rage again by infiltrating into Kargil in 1999, leading to the Kargil War.
This war grew from Pakistan’s attempt to capture part of the territory in Kashmir
(Kargil Review Committee Report 1999, 5.3-5.4). Indian military responded by attacking
the invaders and recapturing their land. Kargil was the third war fought over the disputed
land, speaking to the centrality of the Kashmir issue to hostile relations between the two
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countries.
Despite the cross-border confrontations, India and Pakistan have repeatedly tried
to attain bilateral peace through negotiations and summits. There were five such bilateral
summits between 1966 and 2001. The following table presents a list of these summits:
Table 1: India-Pakistan bilateral summits
Year

Location

Outcome

1966

Tashkent, Uzbekistan

Tashkent Declaration

1972

Simla, India

Shimla Agreement

1989

Islamabad, Pakistan

Joint Statement on desire to
work toward mitigation of
conflict and use of force

1999

Lahore, Pakistan

Lahore Declaration

2001

Agra, India

No declaration

The first two summits were held after the end of the India-Pakistan wars of 1965
and 1971 respectively. As previously mentioned, Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin invited
Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and Pakistani president Ayub Khan to
Tashkent, Uzbekistan to negotiate a peace arrangement in January 1966. The countries
decided to withdraw armed forces involved in the 1961 war and to discuss diplomatic
bilateral relations and issues. However, the agreement was criticized since both sides
entered the discussions with starkly different agendas — India was looking for an
agreement on a “no-war pact” and on discouraging Pakistan from launching any “preemptive strikes” against India; meanwhile, Pakistan viewed this as platform to discuss
Kashmir. Despite a major push for a “no-war pact” by Prime Minister Shastri, Pakistan
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said this would only be possible once the Kashmir issue was resolved (Bajwa 2013, 346347). This highlights that India was looking for all-inclusive progress in the relationship
that would prevent hostile action between the nations. India maintained similar ambitions
during other summits, including the summit in Agra that is of particular importance in
this thesis.
In the aftermath of the 1971 war, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and President
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto came together in Simla in July 1972 to create a comprehensive treaty
for bilateral relations that would establish long-lasting peace and collaboration between
the neighbors. The countries decided to “reverse the consequences of the 1971 war (i.e.
to bring about withdrawals of troops and an exchange of PoWs)” and to “prevent hostile
propaganda directed at each other” (Ministry of External Affairs 1972). The Simla
agreement contained multiple clauses relating to peace in J&K, encouraging both sides to
respect the LoC that demarcates the Indian and Pakistani controlled parts of Kashmir. In
the years following this, both countries built their nuclear powers and finally signed the
Nuclear Non-Aggression Agreement in December 1988 (International Relations Insights
and Analysis). The nuclear armament of both nations brought on an added dimension to
the bilateral relations by further threatening the stability of the region and leading to
nuclear deterrence.
Within this scope, the next India-Pakistan summit followed after 17 years in July
1989 in Islamabad. In the end of 1988, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited Islamabad to
attend the SAARC meeting and negotiated three bilateral settlements with Pakistani
leader Benazir Bhutto: cultural co-operation, prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities
and avoidance of double taxation on civil aviation transactions. Six months later, Rajiv
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Gandhi went to Islamabad for a bilateral summit. Both Gandhi and Bhutto discussed
settlements to reduce conflict; however, there were no major breakthroughs at this
summit (Chandran 2001). Here, I note that national broadcast media was under the
government’s control till during all these summits. This meant that the government had
the power to determine how information would reach the public. However, this changed
in the following summits when the media became privatized, as discussed in the previous
chapter.
The last summit, before the meeting in Agra, took place in February 1999 in
Lahore between Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and President Nawaz Sharif.
During this summit, the leaders reiterated their desire to work toward stronger bilateral
ties by reducing violence, resolving the Kashmir issue and meeting periodically to
strengthen relations. This came to be known as the “Lahore Declaration.” As with former
summits, this declaration sought to establish peace in Kashmir valley. However, merely
three months later, India and Pakistan went to war in May 1999 in the Kargil district of
Kashmir when Pakistani troops crossed the LoC, infiltrating into India (Swami 2006,
186). This became the last war between the two countries and ended in India’s victory.
Given the complex nature of India-Pakistan relations, marked by a series of significant
events, it is important to study the influence of various factors on these events and on the
policy-making process. One such crucial factor is the national media. In the following
chapter, I explore how national media shaped foreign policy toward Pakistan during the
Kargil War and the Agra summit. As is evident from the information presented in this
section, these were pivotal moments in the history of these nations.
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Conclusion

This chapter traced the history of India-Pakistan relations, and the link between
foreign policy and the media in India. Since the role of media in foreign policy finds its
place within the debates surrounding public opinion and foreign policy, this chapter
began with this analysis to see how different arguments in foreign policy theories view
the role of public opinion. Given the importance of public opinion, the evolution of an
unstable and unclear foreign policy in India, and the difficult relations with Pakistan, I
suggest that the media emerge as an important independent actor. In the following
chapters of this thesis, Is further analyze this through case studies and empirical analysis.
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Chapter 2
Covering Kargil: A Case of Consensus

"When one's nation is at war, reporting becomes an extension of the war effort.”
-

Max Hastings, BBC Journalist (quoted in Carruthers 2011, 129)

Hastings accurately captures the essence of being a journalist when one’s country
is at war. He emphasizes that the press becomes part of a national war, expressing
patriotism and garnering public support for the government. This was the case during the
India-Pakistan war fought in Kargil from May to July 1999, popularly known as the
Kargil War. At the time, the media echoed the government’s voice and fostered public
support for government actions. As such, the media define the atmosphere in which
India-Pakistan relations exist (Munter 2016), and one cannot deny the importance of the
national political climate for foreign policy decisions. This chapter explores how national
media in India contributed to the formulation of policy during the conflict in Kargil. I
suggest that broad national consensus during the war positioned the media as the
mouthpiece of the government. In this situation, national media were effective in using an
anti-Pakistan lens to propel the public to support government actions in Kargil.
The 1999 war was fought over the disputed territory of Kashmir in the northern
region of India, after Pakistani soldiers infiltrated Indian territory, crossing the LoC that
demarcates Indian territory in Kashmir. As previously mentioned, this was the first IndiaPakistan war following large-scale privatization of media in India in 1991. Private media
channels allowed for independent opinions to emerge from within the media since the
news was no longer under the direct control of the government. Thus, the news media did
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not have an obligation to support government views. As such, the media played a crucial
role in determining the domestic atmosphere during the war. This makes the Kargil War
an especially important for analyzing the intersection of private media, warfare and
foreign policy.

Image 2: Geographical location of Kargil. The dotted line represents the Line of Control
To gain an in-depth understanding of the media’s role, I reviewed scholarly works
on the Kargil war and carried out empirical analysis of media coverage and government
responses. I suggest that the media helped shape policy during the Kargil War by echoing
government voice and by manufacturing public consent in the nation. While the media
were important, they did not necessarily present independent views; rather, they used
strategies such as framing and agenda setting to manufacture consent for government
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decisions during the war. In order to do so, the media promoted an anti-Pakistan
narrative, driven through an Indian nationalist lens. However, to grasp the nature of the
media’s contribution during the war, it is essential to understand the history of IndiaPakistan conflicts, the creation of the LoC, and the events and challenges in Kargil. This
framework is crucial for exploring how the media covered the stories from the war. Thus,
I begin the following section by briefly exploring the necessary tenets of historical
relations and the Kargil War

The War in Kargil

The Kargil War can only be understood when placed in context of past IndiaPakistan hostilities, with knowledge of historical military tensions and aggression
between the two countries. Given that bilateral relations are contentious and problematic,
the India-Pakistan matter incites widespread public interest and media involvement.
Moreover, as previously mentioned, the conflict-ridden nature of war easily becomes the
“adrenaline” of the media (Rai 2000, 1681). This was especially important with the
Kargil War since it was the first war to reach the homes of the public through broadcast
media. As such, this war is a crucial test-case to explore how the media shape Indian
foreign policy toward Pakistan. However, to be able to understand the role of the media,
it is essential to gain an in-depth understanding of the historical context in order to grasp
the intensity and sensitivity of the situation and of the media’s position. This section
presents a brief account of wars between the two countries, the establishment of the LoC,
and the details of events in Kargil.
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Establishing the Line of Control (LoC)
The Line of Control (LoC) spans 740 km and demarcates Indian territory in
Kashmir from that of Pakistan. Of these 740 km, 168 km lie in the Kargil region,
infiltrated by Pakistani troops in 1999 (Kargil Review Committee Report 1999, 16). Sunil
Rao states that “the development of the LoC has a complex and intricate history,
commencing with the lapse of British paramountcy, followed by the first war over
Jammu and Kashmir, diplomatic interplay by the United Nations (UN), a further two
wars in six years and negotiated bilateral agreements” (Rao 2016, 103). Rao accurately
captures the complex history of the evolution of the LoC as a journey through bilateral
wars and attempts at peace The first territorial demarcation in Kashmir came about
following the India-Pakistan war of 1948. At this time, the United Nations Commission
for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) established a cease-fire in the region and then went to
create a mutually-agreed “ceasefire line” (CFL) in July 1949 (Rao 2016, 107-108).
However, the CFL was unable to serve its purpose as India and Pakistan went to war over
Kashmir again in 1965 (Rao 2016, 109). Then, as wars continued with the 1971 conflict,
territory along the CFL was redistributed between India and Pakistan . The incumbent
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi met her counterpart Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan and
reached the decision that the nations would keep the newly acquired territories and
establish a new territorial demarcation—the Line of Control (LoC), embedded in the
Simla Agreement (Kargil Review Committee 1999, 2.46). The LoC encouraged military
personnel to stay within their territory; this agreement collapsed in 1999, when the Kargil
incursions took place (Rao 2016, 114). Hence, this background helps us understand the
importance of the LoC in preventing cross-border skirmishes between India and Pakistan.
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Further, this highlights that Pakistan breached historical agreements by traversing the
LoC to enter Kashmir during the Kargil War. However, before delving into the analysis
of Kargil, it is crucial to understand the wars that preceded it so as to gauge the trajectory
of intention and military successes of India and Pakistan.
Wars Before Kargil: 1947-199913
India and Pakistan went to war three times from before Kargil—1948, 1965, and
1971. The inability to establish peace between the countries is closely connected to their
difference in ideologies and ambition. Sumit Ganguly argues that a crucial factor in
determining the state of conflict between the two nations has been Pakistan’s quest for
Kashmir (Ganguly 2001, 5). As such, the relevance of the Kashmir issue cannot be
denied given the repetitive wars over the region. Two of the three wars before Kargil had
to do with territorial conquests in Kashmir. In 1999, Pakistan tried to gain control over
parts of the region again, leading to the Kargil war.
Chaos in Kargil
The Kargil region was an especially challenging place for warfare. Hostile action
and difficult terrains made it difficult for soldiers to carry out military endeavors. The
mountainous region of Kargil has peaks ranging from 13,000 feet to 18,000 feet,
segregated by frequent depressions and crests and connected by what can best be
categorized as “tracks” (Qadir 2008, 25). During the winter the Indian army vacates the
Dras-Kargil sector of Kashmir and it is manned solely by an infantry brigade. Extreme
weather conditions seriously limited the ability of Indian winter patrol crew of April 1999
to carry out its functions. To this point, the military had not taken the necessary measures
to equip its personnel with the appropriate gear to serve in such times, making these
13

For details on the wars between 1947 and 1999, refer to chapter 1.
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“hazardous posts” (Kargil Review Committee 1999, 4.5-4.9). This allowed for Pakistani
intrusion into Kargil.
The Pakistani military built their conspiracy to infiltrate the LoC in November
1998 (Qadir 1999,25). Although the infiltration began in April 1999, the intrusions were
first detected on May 3, 1999 by “shepherds,” employed by the Brigade Intelligence for
information gathering; by 1999, the Indian military was sure that the intruders were
Pakistani military personnel (Kargil Review Committee 1999, 5.27-5.30). The Kargil
Review Committee identifies Pakistan’s “politico-strategic” and “military/proxy war”
motives, including the effort to “give a fillip to militancy in J&K, … to activate militancy
in the Kargil and Turtok sectors and open new routes for infiltration into the valley, …
and to alter the LoC and disrupt its sanctity by capturing unheld areas in Kargil” (Kargil
Review Committee 1999, 5.3-5.4). These motives draw attention to Pakistan’s intention
to gain control of Kashmir, as was seen in the wars of 1948 and 1965. The following
table details the military reaction of the Indian side:

Table 2: Indian Army reaction to Pakistani infiltration into Kargil
Date

Indian Army Action

Last week of April

Pakistani helicopters observed flying in Haneef

May 3

Intrusion detected by "shepherds" retained by
Brigade Intelligence Team for forward Information
gathering

May7

Presence of intruders confirmed by patrols

May 9

Two Indian Army battalions returning from Siachen
concentrated in Batalik to contain the intrusion

Following days

Three more battalions moved to Kargil to counter
intruders

May 24

Two more Brigades committed
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May 26

Indian Air Force committed

End of May

Additional divisional HQ inducted to take over
command of a portion of Kargil Sector from 3
Infantry Divisions

* Info from Kargil Review Report 1999, 5.32 - 5.35
As the above table explains, the Indian side was quick to react to the infiltration.
Eventually, Indian forces were able to recapture areas targeted by the militants, making
their mission of pushing back the infiltrators successful (Qadir 1999, 27). Critics suggest
that Pakistan miscalculated the condemnation it would receive from international actors
and India’s military response (Dixit 2001, 65). The cross-border aggression lasted seven
weeks and claimed 1000 thousand lives. Eventually, India claimed victory in July 1999
(Thussu 2002, 207). Thus, Kargil presented a chaotic situation where the Pakistani
military capitalized on India’s decision to leave the Kargil region unmanned during the
winter months. However, Pakistan was unable to accomplish its aim of altering the LoC
and was eventually defeated in battle. Nonetheless, an important outside actor emerged
during the war—the media. Kargil became the first televised war between India and
Pakistan. Having explored the necessary context to the conflict, I now proceed to
discussing the media’s contribution during the Kargil War.

Media and the Kargil Coverage

The Kargil war is evidence that the media function primarily as a voice for the
government when the nation is at war. To understand the relation between warfare and
the media, it is crucial to note the words of Ajai Rai, research fellow at the Indian
Institute for Defence Studies and analyzes:
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Conflict is the adrenalin of the media. Journalists are trained to look for
disagreements and find war irresistible. And when it happens to be 'our war', the
involvement of the media has been assessed to be much more enthusiastic and
extensive. The Kargil conflict in the summer of '99 broke out at a time when the
Indian media was far better equipped than ever before to project it on an
unprecedented scale (Rai 2000, 1681).
Rai aptly captures the essence of media involvement in conflict — driven by the
interest invoked by the war and enhanced by nationalist sentiments. Government officials
reaffirmed this idea in their statements. Then Indian Minister of External Affairs Jaswant
Singh called attention to the importance of national media in a speech following the
Kargil War. Singh found that the media’s “exuberant bordering” of the war contributed
invaluably to the national challenge in Kargil, especially when it came to garnering
support from the public (Singh 1999). This confirms that the media’s role as a link
between the government and the people of the nation was widely recognized and
acknowledged.
The role of the media came under the spotlight with their coverage in Kargil as
this war became India’s “first televised conflict” (Thussu 2010, 207). Until 1991, Indian
television media was largely centralized, marked by a single government-run channel
Doordarshan. At this point, the media underwent a phase of large-scale privatization.
The private channels were considered more credible than Doordarshan in the country.
(Thussu 2010, 208). It is important to note that various media platforms work
collaboratively—broadcast media and the press inform each other and together form the
media network in the country. Thus, the expansion of broadcast networks was significant
to the role of the media in the nation, especially during war when the media were able to
include the public in India’s actions in Kashmir. With Kargil, the government made note
of how the media has a hand in shaping policy. Thussu highlights that coverage of the
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Kargil incident introduced the Indian political leaders to “power of visual media to
maintain the support of public opinion for the hostilities” (Thussu 2010, 207). Thus, the
government realized that media support was crucial to gain national support for their
actions. This indicates the strengthening and evolution of the relationship between
national media and the government, emphasizing the importance of the media in political
processes and actions. This relation is crucial during a war when the nation comes
together to fight a common rival.
During wartime, journalists become part of the action. They are no longer on the
outside of the political system; rather, the media are a part of the government’s ambition
to defeat the enemy. Journalist Michael Herr who covered the Vietnam War, captured the
impact of war on correspondents in stating, “I went to cover the war and the war covered
me” (Herr 2009, 19). Ajai Rai highlights that the media work alongside the “political,
cultural, economic structures” of the nation, finding that reporters respond to the state call
for support and loyalty (Rai 2000, 1686). Max Hastings’ reiterated this in his statement
on media and the nation. He views the media as an “extension” of a nation’s war
(Carruthers 2011, 129). Thus, this suggests that national war consumes journalists so as
to place them in a unique position to garner public support for the nation. This view of
journalists as part of governmental efforts applies to the case in Kargil, where, as seen in
Singh’s statement, the media played an important role in supporting national efforts
during warfare (Singh 1999). The prime minister’s recognition of the media’s role
highlights the ubiquitous nature of the media’s coverage and the extent of their
contribution.
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Within the scope of media support, Geeta Seshu points out that major newspapers
including TOI and Asian Age built a narrative that would engulf the public in the stories
of war—making the conflict a matter for every individual within the country. While
Asian Age launched a game called “I Love India” that allowed players to cross the border
to attack Lahore, TOI’s Kargil project was titles “Zara Yaad Karo Qurbani” (Recall the
martyrdom). These newspapers framed stories to provide a humanistic aspect that readers
could easily sympathize with, presenting the suffering of soldiers’ families and sharing
pictures of soldiers’ bodies. Through this, the press called for consensus from elites
across the country, asking them to support Indian efforts in Kargil (Seshu 1999)14. Seshu
suggests that the media become doubtlessly engrossed in the national mission, no longer
questioning the lacuna in government activity and measures. This suggests that the media
are not only part of this consensus, but also its driving force, in so far as they help the
government garner public support for its action. Here, Seshu notes that the media evoke
nationalist sentiments through their stories, but fail to question the intelligence and
administration of the government during the war. She identifies government’s lapses such
as lack of patrols in the Dras-Kargil region and inability of the intelligence community to
identify the threat when Pakistan ordered snow-wear for the military personnel from
Austrian agencies. Few in the media spoke of these issues on the part of the government.
My empirical analysis suggests that the media acted in support of the government during
the war. Using their power to control the dissemination of information in the national, the
media manufactured public consent for government action by building an anti-Pakistan
narrative through their stories. Nonetheless, I also acknowledge the few expert opinions
14

The details presented in this paragraph are from Geeta Seshu’s article in Economic and Political Weekly,
1999.
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presented in the media that questioned government action. The following section uses
empirical analysis to suggest that the media helped shape government policies during
Kargil by urging manufacturing public support for the government decisions.

Empirical Analysis: Creating Consensus
Selection of Media Sources
I analyzed 13 articles on the Kargil War from TOI and HT. The articles were from
June 1999 to November 1999. As previously mentioned, this was the selection of news
coverage on the the war that was compiled by the Indian Parliament Library. Although a
larger database of articles could have added to and strengthened the analysis,these were
the only clippings from these two newspapers in the collection. Of the 13, eight were
from TOI and five from HT. There were six news articles, six opinion pieces and one
TOI editorial. Despite the limited number of articles, there were noticeable trends in the
coverage.
I also analyzed the statement by Minister of External Affairs Jaswant Singh
following the war, the second session of the 13th Lok Sabha (parliamentary) debate that
discussed the Kargil incident, and the Kargil Review Committee Report of December
199915. Before presenting the findings of the empirical analysis, it is important to
understand the categories that I used for coding, detailed as follows.
Coding of Articles
By segregating these articles and government statements into various categories
through coding, I was able to identify trends in the media’s coverage and in the other
15

This report was compiled by experts including distinguished international affairs analyst K.
Subrahmanyam and former Secretary of the National Security Council Secretariat Satish Chandra.
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selected materials. This allowed me to combine quantitative and qualitative findings to
study the role of the media in the summit, by examining how the media reported the
various events and simultaneously tracking responses and policy decisions by the
government.
I analyzed the selected materials by coding them into the following seven
categories:
1. Consensus: Cases where opposition parties and the media expressed agreement
with the government’s policy decisions and actions.This includes opinion articles
and expression of agreement in parliamentary debates and statements.
2. Dissent: Cases where opposition parties and the media expressed disagreement
with the government’s policy decisions and actions. This includes opinion articles
and expression of disagreement in parliamentary debates and statements.
3. Government Mention of Media: All references by the government to the role of
the media during the Kargil War in parliamentary debates, press releases and as
reported in media articles.
4. Agenda Setting: References in articles that urge the government to adopt a
specific policy or highlight specific issues that the government should focus on.
This includes all articles that attempt to set the agenda for the government.
5. Media Framing16: References the editorial and opinion articles in the newspapers
that offer a particular viewpoint (negative or positive) of the Kargil War, framing
their analysis through “interpretive frames” and determining the public’s
perception of the incident.
16

For definitions of media framing and agenda setting, refer to the section on media strategies in the
introduction.
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6. Anti-Pakistan: Articles that display a negative bias toward Pakistan by
constructing the story with a negative stance or perspective. This is a specific case
of framing that is important in this analysis.
7. Unbiased News: All news articles that were comprised primarily of quotes and
showed no internal bias toward Pakistan.
Based on this framework for coding, I present the analysis of how media shaped the
Indian government’s policies during Kargil.
Media’s Contribution in Kargil
The analysis I present indicates that there was broad political consensus among
the public, media and political parties during the Kargil war. Based on these findings, I
suggest that the media emerged as an important actor, but not as an independent actor. In
this case, they echoed the voice of the government, using their agenda-setting and
framing strategies to gain public support for government action. As such, the media
manufactured consent for the government by inciting nationalist dialogues. Within this
scope, an important indicator of the media’s contribution is the government’s recognition
of their role, discussed in the following section.
Government-Media Connection
If one is to measure the media’s contribution to the formulation of policies, an
important way to gauge this is through the government’s statements. As previously
mentioned, the media serve as the interlocutor between the government, the opposition
and the public. They control the dissemination of information, making it important for the
government to interact with members of the media. Hence, in this section, I explore the
connections between the government and the media and note the government’s mention
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of media’s involvement during the Kargil War. The government acknowledged the
contribution of national media, embedded in Jaswant Singh’s statement following the
Kargil war:
There was an added dimension to our total national endeavour. It was the role of
our media during Kargil operations. It was marked by exuberant enthusiasm
bordering, at times, on the reckless. These young men and women of the media,
who were in Kargil brought the valour of our troops, in the face of great odds,
directly into the homes of our citizens. They touched our hearts and eyes with the
tales of the bereaved and the families of the fallen. This was our first experience
of conflict in the TV/information age. We learnt as we went along. It would be no
exaggeration, therefore, to say that the role of the electronic and the print media,
in fully informing and mobilizing public opinion, was an invaluable part of the
total national effort to meet the challenge of Kargil (Singh 1999).
In this statement, Singh captures the essence of the government-media interaction in the
age of information, highlighting that both forms of traditional media, broadcast and the
press, were pivotal in driving public opinion in support of government action. It is
important to note that Singh chooses the words “mobilizing public opinion” to discuss the
role of the media. This suggests that he acknowledged that the government needed the
media to gain adequate support from the public. The Kargil Review Committee Report
reiterated this by noting that the media play the role of the informant, keeping national
public apprized about government action on the forefront and thus ensuring that the
masses are not “misled by rumour, propaganda and disinformation. …[since this] is
essential for building national morale, winning popular support and understanding”
(1999, 11.2). Herein, the report emphasizes the government’s understanding of the
media’s role—bringing the nation together in support of the policy decisions. The media
create consensus for government action. However, the reported suggests that the
government-media relation should be strengthened by supplementing routine briefings by
the Ministry of Defence with more “high-level background briefings to editors, senior
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reporters and military commentators” during future wars (1999, 11.9). This
recommendation suggests that the committee, largely representing government voice, is
aware of the importance of the media and believes that better cooperation can be
beneficial for the government. It is then crucial to understand how the media form the
communication channel between the government and the opposition.
The media are also able to provide information to the members of the opposition
party who can then hold the government accountable in parliament (Baum & Potter 2015,
21). As such, the media act as the link between various political actors; they serve as the
opposition’s information on government actions and thus retain their importance as the
arbitrator. This is evident in the opposition’s references to the media during
parliamentary debates. In the parliamentary session of December 22, following the Kargil
war, Priya Dasmunsi of the INC referenced the media in two important critiques of the
government: media reports about the “lapse on the part of Intelligence” and the delay in
the submission of the Kargil Review Committee Report. Dasmunsi observed that the
media reported that the Chairman of the Kargil Review Committee, Shri Subramaniam
was to meet the Prime Minister before the parliamentary session and requested
information on the status of the report (Thirteenth Lok Sabha Debates, Session II, 1999).
In so referencing the media, Dasmunsi credited the media as his source of information.
This establishes that the media find their way into parliamentary debates as the acting
mediator and informant. My empirical analysis indicates that the government made
references to the media in all government documents and parliamentary debates that were
selected for analysis. Thus, the media play a role not only in building consensus in the
nation during war, but also in providing information to parliamentarians and to the
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public. In so doing, they contribute significantly to the dialogue surrounding war in the
nation and help the government sell its policy. However, the media’s role is largely
dependent on the degree of political harmony in the nation. In the case of Kargil, national
consensus allowed the media to serve as the government’s mouthpiece.
Kargil: A Case of Consensus
In most cases, one expects opposition parties to disagree with government
decisions so as to garner more support for themselves and demean the acting government
in public eye. So, when the opposition expresses consensus, one is able to fathom the
extent of the unity in a country. This was the case during Kargil. Priya Dasmunsi of the
leading opposition party, the INC stated during a parliamentary session:
I would like to draw the attention of the Government and point out that the entire
nation irrespective of caste, creed or religion stood by the Government like a rock
in the hour of crisis when our brave jawans tried to defend the country in Kargil.
The entire nation, the Government and all the political parties paid tributes to the
jawans of the Armed Forces, Air Forces, Paramilitary Forces and the Civilians,
who laid down their lives in Kargil (Thirteenth Lok Sabha Debates, Session II,
1999).
Dasmunsi highlights the domestic state during the war. The nation—political parties, the
public and the media—came together in nationalist ambitions, building on their antiPakistan perceptions. Jaswant Singh acknowledged this consensus in his speech and
further emphasized the consensus within the various government departments acting in
unison to defeat the forces from Pakistan:
It is noteworthy that under the leadership of the Prime Minister the Ministries of
External Affairs and the Ministry of Defence worked as one, the combined
synergy of which demonstrated the true power and effectiveness of the Indian
State. This is, of course, how it should be. But it is a matter of satisfaction
nevertheless, that this was achieved at a time of trial, a time which tests the mettle
of any Government's machinery (Singh 1999).
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The internal consensus within the government, supported by the external agreement from
the people of the nation led to a broad national consensus surrounding the Kargil War.
Quantitative and qualitative analysis of the media sources indicate similar results.
Quantitatively, the following pie chart displays a greater share of consensus expressed in
news articles and government speeches as compared to dissent, supporting the above
statements with statistical results. Of the 16 items analyzed and coded for this analysis,
five articles (31% of the total) indicated consensus, while only two (13% of the total)
indicated dissent, i.e. there was more than twice the evidence for consensus. As seen in
the parliamentary and government statements, it is difficult to refute the existence of
domestic consensus during the Kargil War.

Figure 2: Consensus during Kargil

Taneja 64

Table 3: Summary of coding on consensus during Kargil
Nodes

Number of items coded

Per cent of total items coded

Dissent (Orange)

5

31%

Consensus (Blue)

2

13%

*Colors in brackets indicate the corresponding colors in the pie chart
The media articulated this national consensus, both expressing it and encouraging
it. In an article in TOI on July 26, 1999, K. Subrahmanyam, chairman of the Kargil
Review Committee, wrote, “Never before has the country felt so united as in the last
eight weeks” (Subrahmanyam 1999). While the media expressed agreement, journalist
Sumir Lal wrote, “We are being told not to cross-examine the government … because we
all must stand together lest we demoralise the troops” (Lal, 1999). With this, Lal is
among the few journalists who questioned government’s intelligence and administration
during the war. Although this calls attention to the question of the motivation for the
journalists to support the government and promote unity within the country, it continues
to emphasize that most journalists did indeed express consensus, regardless of the driving
factor. Here, I return to Rai’s categorization of journalists during war: Rai finds that most
journalists respond promptly to the state’s “appeal for loyalty, as responsible citizens of
their country at war,” however, a few struggled to maintain objectivity and refrain
attachment (Rai 2000, 1686). By this measure, Lal was one of the select few who did not
immediately accept the government’s call for consensus. By and large, however, national
consensus united the nation in the mission to defeat Pakistan in Kargil. As previously
noted, the media helped manufacture consent among the public just as they expressed the
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consensus among political actors. It is then crucial to discuss the uniting motion for the
consensus—media framing and the anti-Pakistan narrative.
Framing the Story: The Anti-Pakistan Agenda
As the source of information for the public, the media retain the authority to
determine the amount and composition of news they present. This control over
information allows them in determine the angle they use to deliver this news, driving
public perception by presenting the news from a specific standpoint. This gives the media
the power to create “interpretive frames” (Gamson and Wolfsfeld 1993). In the case of
the Kargil war, this frame was an anti-Pakistan narrative, used as the tool to bring
together the nation against a common enemy.
Of the 16 sources used for coding, six (38%) had explicit anti-Pakistan references.
This includes both government statements and news articles. Calling the infiltration into
Kargil an “ill-conceived misadventure” on the part of Pakistan, Jaswant Singh articulated
that “a firm signal [had] to be conveyed to Pakistan” with regards to cross-border
terrorism and the frontline aggression (Singh 1999). Singh effectively placed the entire
burden of the Kargil conflict on Pakistan. Further, the opposition supported the
government in this claim, as Priya Dasmunsi of the INC termed it the “grave threat of
Pakistan” (Thirteenth Lok Sabha Debates, Session II, 1999). Although it has been
factually proven that Pakistan began the conflict through infiltration, the representation of
Pakistan as “ill-conceived” and struck by a “disorder syndrome” engaged the Indian
public in an anti-Pakistan discourse as the driving force for national consensus.
The media lent their support to political leaders to build this anti-Pakistan
narrative by supporting their actions and publishing stories that would evoke nationalist
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sentiments. In an article titled “The defense of India,” public intellectual Brahma
Chellaney presented India as a “tolerant, peace-loving society,” driven to security by its
neighbors. He wrote, “With two [Pakistan and China] strong, collusive regional
adversaries, India has to harness the ongoing revolution in military affairs (RMA) to
build a distinct technological edge” (Chellaney 1999). Effectively portraying India as a
victim of Pakistan’s cross-border military endeavors, Chellaney proposed to the public
that India is a naive nation, thus presenting India as the victim and propelling public
sentiment against Pakistan. Contributing to this narrative, former Indian ambassador to
Pakistan, K. Shankar Bajpai, wrote an article in TOI titled “Dealing with Pakistan.” Here,
he emphasized that the Indian government must take away from the Kargil incident that
“Pakistan can be fatal” and that it is unlikely that Pakistan’s aggressive behavior will
change in the near future. Framing the anti-Pakistan story, he too presented India as a
sufferer of this aggression, stating that “India had done nothing adverse to Pakistan”
(Bajpai 1999). A TOI editorial called out Pakistan’s action as “Pak’s perfidy” (TOI
1999). Other stories recalled past Pakistani aggressions in Kashmir and the 1971 war in
Bangladesh, going along with the anti-Pakistan framing structure. Beyond this, media
framing extended to stories of human suffering, so as to gain public sympathy and
resultantly include the people in the conversation on war. This call for sympathy
contributed to consensus-building efforts across elites in the country (Seshu 1999). An
article in TOI read “Army battles with problems of widows and wounded soldiers”
(Kumar 1999) drawing attention to the plight of soldiers’ families. Through this
interpretive framework for reporting, the media guided public perception of Kargil in
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favor of the government. In addition to their framing function, the media also took steps
to guide the government’s agenda.
Even in this unity, the media took on the role of agenda setting, encouraging the
government and the public to focus on certain tenets of warfare and its outcomes, and
providing policy suggestions. Rai suggests that such coverage reduces the government’s
response time; in this, it point out issues in policy, but fail to resolve them (Rai 2000,
1681). Seshu notes one example where TOI cautioned the government against the nuclear
option, pursuing the “no first strike” policy, and thus presenting a policy suggestion
(Seshu 1999). Indian academic Madhav Das Nalapat presented policy options in an
article titled “Military needs should dictate policy,” criticizing the diplomatic track of
interaction, and pressurizing the government by stating, “Time is running out for the
Vajpayee government. … Unless the costs of intervention are made prohibitive, Pakistan
is likely to keep testing Indian resolve” (Nalapat 1999). In another article, K.
Subrahmanyam called for a “total revamp” of the Indian security structure to build a
strong front and discourage Pakistan from such invasions (Subrahmanyam 1999). These
articles in top-tier newspapers highlight the media’s role in calling attention to specific
issues and pointing out governmental flaws. However, one must note that these are fewer
in number and secondary to the articles that focused on building consensus, as noted by
Sumir Lal (Lal 1999). Empirical analysis indicates similar trends of media’s role in
garnering public support through strategies including manufacturing consent, framing and
agenda setting. Here, the media act in support of the executives of the government.
In this case, the media’s voice is not necessarily independent. While the media try
to garner elite support for the government, critics including Seshu suggest that these elites
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not only support the media, but also guide their agenda, especially since the owners of
these media houses are themselves among the elites (Seshu 1999). For instance, the
owner of Hindustan Times, Shobhana Bhartia is a former member of parliament in the
upper house for the opposition party INC, indicating her strong political inclinations and
involvement. This supports the idea of “manufacturing consent,” as proposed by Noam
Chomsky. He explained that the media work under the “propaganda model,” serving as a
mouthpiece for the elites and for the government, by helping them gain support and build
consensus (Chomsky and Herman 1988, 306). In the case of the Kargil War, analysis
suggests that the media were manufacturing consent for government action by creating
campaigns such as Asian Age’s “I Love India” game and TOI’s “Zara yaad karo
qurbani,” to synthesize public engagement and involvement and by promoting a negative
image of Pakistan. In this way, the media were serving as the government’s delegates as
they tried to draw the nation’s elites to consensus.
Thus, even though I had access to a limited number of articles, these displayed
clear trends in reporting. Read alongside government’s statements and parliamentary
debates, one can note that the media both expressed the consensus that existed within
political actors and manufactured consent among the public. Here, they acted as the
essential interlocutor between the government, the public and the opposition.The media
strengthened domestic consensus by evoking nationalist sentiment and dialogues, by
defining the nation’s political atmosphere, and by garnering public support for the
government’s policy toward Pakistan during the war. As such, they emerged not as an
independent actor, but as a crucial support-system for the government.
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Conclusion

The Kargil war was marked by large-scale national consensus in India, bringing
together the people in a battle against the common adversary, Pakistan. In addition to
discussing the media, this chapter outlined the history of bilateral relations and the real
time events in Kargil that form an essential foundation to understand the role of the
media. Within the India-Pakistan rivalry, the media played a crucial role, emerging as an
important actor to support government action by expressing consensus and manufacturing
consent in the public. While a handful of experts used the media to express concern about
government policies, most joined in the national consensus, echoing the voice of the
government and propagating an anti-Pakistan narrative. It appears that the war gave the
media an opportunity to emerge as a crucial wing among the political actors of the nation,
but not necessarily as an independent one. Nonetheless, as mentioned by the leaders of
the government and by the opposition, the media played a significant role in shaping
foreign policy during the Kargil War.
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Chapter 3
The Agra Summit: A Retreat with the Media

Summits demonstrate the intention of two nations to improve bilateral ties by
engaging in dialogue and negotiation. As such, bilateral summits serve as a crucial point
of contact and development in relationships, where decision-makers come together to
build a collaborative forward-looking policy. In the case of India and Pakistan, bilateral
summits are extremely important as they have symbolised moments of peace after
warfare. To this end, India-Pakistan summits are especially sensitive, suggesting that any
uproar or sensationalization caused by the media can be problematic. This was the case
during the 2001 summit. The Agra Summit, a retreat to strengthen bilateral relations
between India and Pakistan, took place from July 14-16, 2001. The summit followed a
period of non-communication between the two nations and came as an unexpected
change in Indian policy toward Pakistan. Since the Kargil war in 1999, India maintained
the position that it would not engage in talks with Pakistan till the latter mitigated crossborder terrorism and incursions from its end (Bhat 2001, 194; Singh, Thirteenth Lok
Sabha Debates, Session VII, 2001). Against this backdrop of antagonism, the Agra
Summit was an attempt to engage in a comprehensive dialogue with Pakistan on bilateral
ties ranging from people-to-people contact to issues of terrorism. However, it was widely
acknowledged as a failed summit. It is then important to understand the immediate
outcome of the summit before exploring the role of the media.
Critics were quick to declare the summit a failure, taking into account that no
agreement came from the summit. They noted that Musharraf was unhappy with the draft
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declaration, stated that he wanted to “walk out” of the summit, but was dissuaded by his
senior officials (Hindu 2009). Eventually, Musharraf left the summit “grim-faced” at
midnight on July 16 (Dixit 2001, 138). J.N. Dixit analyzed the reasons for the failure of
the summit, finding that the primary challenge was the difference in the agendas of the
two countries. While Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee focused on normalising
India-Pakistan relations, the only agenda for Musharraf was resolving the Kashmir
dispute (Dixit 2001, 140). As evident, the motivations of the two leaders did not align
leading to India’s unreal expectations.
Many observed this loophole in the government’s plan. Chaudhuri, who was
among the media personnel in Agra at the time, found that the Indian government “fooled
itself” in this case. Chaudhuri explained that “they [the Indian government] went into the
summit with assumptions, partly because of incorrect briefings within the government,
that Musharraf wants to cut a deal. They believed Musharraf is interest in coming to
some sort of a forward movement.” However, the Vajpayee government soon realized
that this was not the case and then tried to spin the story, rather unsuccessfully, to make it
seem like the summit had not been a complete failure (Chaudhuri 2017). This discussion
extended to parliamentary debates, where members of the opposition party, the INC,
declared that the summit was a “miserable failure.” Bhati strongly criticized the
government’s decision to ignore history, abruptly change government policy and hold
talks with Pakistan (Thirteenth Lok Sabha Debates, Session VII, 2001). It is important to
note that to this point, India had maintained that it would not engage with military leaders
in Pakistan who undemocratically gained control of the country in October 1999. This
was the case with General Musharraf who had overthrown the elected leader, Nawaz
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Sharif, in a military coup (Dixit 2001, 136). As a result, Vajpayee’s decision to ignore the
policy of non-communication, invited poignant criticisms in parliament and led to
widespread disagreement between the nation’s political actors. Within this scope of
dissent and failure, we can now explore how the media contributed to the government’s
decisions.
Rao, who was the Spokesperson of the MEA during the Agra Summit, holds that
media from both nations had a significant role in the limited outcome of the summit.
Blaming media for the failure of the summit, Ambassador Rao said that when it comes to
bilateral affairs, “It’s like you’re conducting foreign policy in an amphitheatre” (Rao
2016). This suggests that the media play a role in determining the atmosphere in which
bilateral relations exists. This speaks to the centrality of the media in policy-making.
Analysis of media coverage and parliamentary debates indicates the importance of
government interaction with the media during such events. To this end, it is then
important to analyze the role of the media in foreign policy decisions in the scope of the
Agra Summit. In this chapter, I discuss the following:
1. How national dissent made room for the media to enter the dialogue on the
summit
2. The media’s role in the formulation of foreign policy strategy. Here, I address
how the media emerge a crucial independent actor
I first discuss the motivations for the summit in India and the agenda of the summit.
Then, I use primary analytical research of newspaper articles and parliamentary debates
in context of real-time events to highlight the role of national media during the Agra
Summit.
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In context of the Agra Summit, I suggest that national dissent allows the media to
contribute to the debate as an arbitrator and as an independent actor expressing their
opinion and controlling the dissemination of information. While the government tries to
use the media as a marketing agent for its policies, the opposition uses the media to
express disagreement, and as an unintended consequence, the media emerge as a
powerful political actor. I analyze how the failure of the summit was linked to the
government’s inadequate interaction with the media. This left the country uninformed
about the progress during the summit, and the government failing to gain the needed
support for their policy decisions. This draws our attention to the role of the media as the
acting network of communication in the country. Due to its lack of engagement with the
media, the government was unable to garner the necessary national support, driving the
country to a state of widespread dissent. This suggests that the government may have
been able to tackle this issue by adequately interacting with and informing the media of
its decisions and actions. Here, as the interlocutor, the media may have been able to
garner support for the government among the public. To better understand the role of the
media, one must grasp the history of India-Pakistan summits, the motivations for the
Agra Summit, and the agenda in Agra.
Prior to the Agra Summit India and Pakistan had only four bilateral summits,
beginning in 1966. As discussed earlier, India and Pakistan have not had a smooth
relationship since their partition in 194717. These summits took place in 1966, 1972,
1989, and 1999. Analysis of these summits, presented in chapter two, suggests that there
was a trend in agendas of the two countries. While India sought to establish better holistic
relations with Pakistan, the latter continually used summits as a way to further its agenda
17

For more information on bilateral relations and former summits, please refer to chapter 1.
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in Kashmir. As previously mentioned, following the last summit in February 1999,
Pakistani troops infiltrated the LoC that led to the Kargil War. Noting that the
government had pursued a non-communication policy toward Pakistan after this war, I
begin by exploring the motivations behind the summit.

Motivations for the Agra Summit

Acknowledging that India and Pakistan had no bilateral communication between
1999 and 2001, it is then important to understand what encouraged the Vajpayee
government to hold the Agra Summit in 2001. Dixit explains that India had refused to
collaborate or even speak with any military ruler in Pakistan who had come to power
through “unconstitutional means” (Dixit 2001, 136), as had Musharraf. Thus, although
Musharraf had earlier stated that he was open to discussions with his neighboring
country, India had turned down the possibility. However, on May 24, 2001, the Vajpayee
government invited Musharraf to India for the summit. Drawing from conversations with
“people in the highest political levels in the Government of India” (Dixit 2001, 136),
Dixit explains that Vajpayee himself was apprehensive of hosting such a summit and was
more keen on meeting Musharraf at multilateral gatherings such as SAARC. Minister of
Home Affairs, L.K. Advani, along with other BJP cabinet ministers, recommended that
Vajpayee take “drastic” measures to “break out of the logjam of the complete breakdown
in bilateral communications which had occurred since the Kargil war in 1999.” BJP
leaders made the final decision regarding the summit at Mr. Advani’s house in April
2001 (Dixit 2001, 137).
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In addition, J.K. Baral cites two major reasons for the summit: (1) India’s “despair
and frustration” (Baral 2002, 290); and (2) international pressure, especially that from the
United States. As for India’s frustration, the invitation to Agra followed the failure of
cease-fire treaties to maintain peace in Kashmir. This suggests that Vajpayee extended
the invitation with hopes that this might help in “tackling [cross-border] terrorism” (Baral
2002, 291). Secondly, Baral highlights that the Indian State Department asserted that the
US had suggested they enter talks with Pakistan. He further notes that two months before
the Agra Summit, both India and Pakistan had dialogues with the United States, implying
that there could be a link between the two. Dixit too identifies pressure from the
international community as a major factor in the decision to hold the summit (Dixit 2001,
136). Thus, there are a range of factors that influenced Vajpayee’s decision to invite
Musharraf for summit. These were premised on the hope that the summit would lead to
improved bilateral relations. Having explored the motivations that led to the summit, it is
now feasible to detail the agenda that the countries pursued during the summit.

The Agenda in Agra

Pakistan and India had starkly different political agendas for Agra. This made for
colliding ideas and intentions, especially since the Indian government held false
expectations that Musharraf wanted to heal relations at large, when Musharraf primarily
wanted to discuss the Kashmir dispute (Chaudhuri 2017). This difference in agendas
dictated how the countries approached the events of the summit. The following table lists
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the series of events as they occurred during the Agra Summit. It provides details on the
interactions between the government and the media.
Table 4: Detailed agenda of the Agra Summit
Date

Event

Notes

Pre-Summit

Non-communication

There was no political communication between
the countries from May 1999 (after the Kargil
War) to July 2001, when the Agra summit took
place (Dixit 2001).

May 24, 2001

Vajpayee government
extends invitation for
summit to General
Musharraf

The motivations for the invitations are discussed
in the previous section (Dixit 2001, 138)

May 27, 2001

Musharraf accepts
invitation for Agra
Summit

(Dixit 2001, 138)

May 28, 2001

Jaswant Singh announces Over 250 media persons and 20 camera teams
Musharraf’s visit in a
attended this conference in Delhi (Bhat 2001,
press conference
193)

July 9, 2001

They did this by lifting barriers along LOC to
allow Pakistani citizens to travel to Jammu and
Indian government takes Kashmir. They also announced 25 scholarships
measures to express
for Pakistani students to pursue higher education
goodwill and increase
and research in India. In addition, they released
people-to-people contact Pakistani civilian prisoners (Baral 2002, 293).

Approximately five
Interaction with the
days before the summit national media in India

July 12, 2001

July 14. 2001

Foreign Secretary Chokila Iyer interacted with
the national media regarding the Agra Summit
(Bhat 2001, 196)

Press Conference in
India

External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh held a
press conference to address the questions
brought up in the media regarding Musharraf’s
visit (Bhat 2001, 196).

Tea Party at Pakistani
High Commissioner's
Residence

Musharraf and his team invited Hurriyat leaders
(Kashmiri separatists) for a tea party upon the
arrival of the President, although India expressed
reluctance to such an event. The Pakistani
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leaders had a “closed door meeting” with
Hurriyat where Pakistan reiterated their moral
support. The ruling NDA government boycotted
this event and the government and INC sent only
“token representatives” (Baral 2002, 294).

July 15, 2001

At this meeting, Musharraf presented a draft
accord prepared by Pakistan, which highlighted
Kashmir as the core issue and failed to
acknowledge the matter of cross-border
terrorism. It stated the following: "The process
Second one-on-one
of normalization of Indo-Pak relations is
meeting between
dependent upon the solution of the Kashmir
Vajpayee and Musharraf dispute" (Baral 2002, 294).

July 15, 2001

Minister of Information and Broadcasting,
Sushma Swaraj held a press briefing in the
evening and listed subjects of discussions during
the summit: cross-border terrorism, nuclear
issue, prisoners-of-war, and trade. However, she
Minister of Information did not mention Kashmir in her list. On the
and Broadcasting makes Pakistani side, the media and the government
statement to the Press
criticized Swaraj for this as they worried that this
about the discussions at would lead the people in Pakistan to think that
the summit, which causes Musharraf had ignored the matter of Kashmir at
a controversial uproar in the summit. They then held Swaraj responsible
Pakistan.
for the failure of the summit (Baral 2002, 298).

July 16, 2001

Musharraf holds
breakfast meeting with
Indian editors

The Indian editors did not know this meeting
was to be filmed by Pakistani TV. They were
told it was off-the-record, and only discovered
that it was telecast live at the end when the
Pakistani side gave a copy of the tape to the
editor of NDTV, Pranoy Roy. It came as a shock
to the editors and to the government when
NDTV broadcasted the film from this meeting
(Bhat 2001, 197; Baral 2002, 298).

Summit ends and
Musharraf leaves

No conclusion was reached and no declaration
came from the summit. Musharraf left the
summit “grim-faced” at midnight (Dixit 200,
138). Pakistan extended an invitation to continue
negotiations in Islamabad. The Vajpayee

July 16, 2001
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government accepted (Baral 2002, 302).

July 17, 2001

Indian Minister of
External Affairs Jaswant
Singh and Pakistani
Foreign Minister Abdul
Sattar hold press
conferences in their
respective nations.

July 20, 2001

At this meeting, Pakistani journalists only asked
questions that would allow the government
reassert its view and further its agenda,
suggesting that the media were helping the
Musharraf holds press
government gain support in Pakistan (Baral
conference in Islamabad 2002, 297).

Sattar stated that the summit ended
“inconclusively.” However, both leaders
affirmed that the two sides had decided to
continue talks and summits. (Dixit 2001, 138140)

Multiple factors came together to make the Agra Summit a failure. As previously
mentioned, the difference in Indian and Pakistani agendas for the summit led to an
undeniable impasse. In addition, it is important to acknowledge the central role of media
in the turn of events that led to a deadlock between India and Pakistan. As noted in the
above table, there were two major issues arising from the government’s interaction with
the media: (1) Sushma Swaraj’s statement to the Press, and (2) Musharraf’s breakfast
meeting with the editors.
As for the former, Sushma Swaraj, Minister of Information and Broadcasting,
arrived at the conference on the 15th of July and held a press briefing. Ambassador
Nirupama Rao, then spokesperson for the MEA, explained that Swaraj listed subjects that
had been discussed during the summit, but omitted Kashmir from the list. Acting in
defense, Swaraj claimed that it was rather obvious that the two sides discussed Kashmir.
However, the Pakistani side did not buy this argument for the fear that the people of
Pakistan would think that Musharraf ignored the Pakistani agenda (Rao 2016). As a
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result, the Pakistani media targeted Swaraj because of her statement, leading to discord
between the two parties. Eventually, Pakistan blamed Swaraj for the inconclusive
outcome of the summit (Baral 2002, 298). Here, it is important to note that this issue was
aggravated by the media (Rao 2016). Thus, the media were able to report Swaraj’s
statement so as to sensationalize it and create a controversy. This suggests that the media
played a major role in the impasse that occurred between India and Pakistan.
In another instance, President Musharraf held a breakfast meeting with the Indian
editors on the last day of the summit. As explained in the table 3, members of the media
were unaware that this meeting was filmed and telecast live in Pakistan. Rather, they
were under the impression that it was off the record. However, after the meeting, the
Pakistani side gave NDTV a copy of the tape which was eventually broadcast in India (
Bhat 2001, 197). As a result of this incident, the Indian government was criticized at
home for mismanaging the media, allowing Musharraf to use the media for his benefit
(Dixit 2001, 139). Further, the government was condemned for not adequately engaging
with the media. The Indian government responded to such criticism during parliamentary
debates and press briefings. Jaswant Singh stated the following during a press conference
on the 20th of July :
On the second aspect relating to ‘why was Prime Minister Vajpayee’s opening
statement in the plenary held back’, it was done for the obvious reason which I
have specified. India does not believe that discussions or negotiations between
two Heads of Government are ever or can ever be conducted in public or through
the press. We abided by that impeccably. However, when we found that there was
a kind of approach fiom the other side of engaging with the media as an
additionality to discussion (Bhat 2001, 200).
This highlights that while Pakistan used the media to make the summit a matter of public
knowledge and interest and to sell its case, India wanted to conduct the negotiations in a
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private sphere. This brings to light the role of the media as a “marketing agent”: one that
sells government policy and decision to those at home in order to garner public support.
Simultaneously, the opposition used the media as a tool to express dissent. This is evident
in the media’s wide coverage of disagreement voiced by the opposition parties. I discuss
this through primary research in the following section.
Empirical analysis emphasizes the existence of national dissent surrounding the
summit and confirms the role of the media as a mediator and as an independent actor,
framing the story of the summit using a lens that is critical of Pakistan and of government
policy. In this way, the media presented the opinions and news frames that did not
directly draw from the government or the opposition. This emphasizes their existence as
an independent actor within the political system. For the purpose of this research, I
carried out extensive research by coding 112 articles of the summit, analyzing
parliamentary debates, and conducting a series of interviews with government officials,
renowned journalists, and distinguished scholars. The results from this research are
presented in the following section.
Empirical Analysis: Dissent and the Media
1. Selection of Media Sources
I analyzed 112 articles on the Agra Summit from TOI. These articles were from
July 13, 2001 to August 30, 2001. For the month of July, I analyzed all articles on the
Agra Summit available in the TOI digital archives. For the month of August, I analyzed
all TOI articles selected by the Indian Parliament Library media clippings on the Agra
Summit. Since this file of media clippings from the library was only available for August
2001, I was unable to use this method of selection for July. The final collection included
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13 editorials, 42 opinion pieces and 57 news articles. In addition, I analyzed two relevant
government statements about the summit and the seventh session of the 13th Lok Sabha
(parliamentary) debate that discussed the Agra Summit. The following section details the
categories of coding.
2. Coding of Articles
Segregating the news articles and other materials into various categories through
coding allowed me to determine the trends in reporting. This allowed me to combine
statistical and qualitative findings to explore the role of media during the summit. I did
this by examining how the media covered the various events and by simultaneously
tracking the government’s responses and policy decisions.
I analyzed the selected materials by coding them into the following seven
categories:
1. Consensus: Cases where opposition parties and the media expressed agreement
with the government’s policy decisions and actions.This includes opinion articles
and expression of agreement in parliamentary debates and statements.
2. Dissent: Cases where opposition parties and the media expressed disagreement
with the government’s policy decisions and actions. This includes opinion articles
and expression of disagreement in parliamentary debates and statements.
3. Government Mention of Media: All references by the government to the role of
the media during the Agra Summit in parliamentary debates, press releases and as
reported in media articles.
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4. Agenda Setting: References in articles that urge the government to adopt a
specific policy or highlight specific issues that the government should focus on.
This includes all articles that attempt to set the agenda for the government.
5. Media Framing18: References the editorial and opinion articles in the newspapers
that offer a particular viewpoint (negative or positive) of the Agra Summit,
framing their analysis through “interpretive frames” and determining the public’s
perception of the incident.
6. Anti-Pakistan: Articles that display a negative bias toward Pakistan by
constructing the story with a negative stance or perspective. This is a specific case
of framing that is important in this analysis.
7. Unbiased News: All news articles that were comprised primarily of quotes and
showed no internal bias toward Pakistan.
In addition, I made note of all articles and references that suggested that India and
Pakistan had different political agendas in Agra. Within this scope of coding, I present
the analysis of how media contributed to the Indian government’s policy-making during
the Agra Summit.

Role of the Media: Marketing and Mediating
Analysis of Sources
Critics, including opposition leaders and journalists, recognized the government’s
failure in Agra. To explain this failure, they identified the government’s inability to
interact effectively with the media as an important cause for this failure (Thirteenth Lok
18

For definitions of media framing and agenda setting, refer to the section on media strategies in the
introduction.
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Sabha Debates, Session VII, 2001). Rao complained that too much media came for the
retreat emphasizing that the media wanted to know the progress “after every breath” (Rao
2016). On the other hand, Chaudhuri pointed out that the government itself notified the
media about the Agra Summit (Chaudhuri 2017). Evidence from the news, scholarly
work and parliamentary debates suggests that the summit was unsuccessful in its aim to
strengthen India-Pakistan relations through a comprehensive dialogue. There are
numerous references to the government’s mismanagement of and lack of interaction with
the press. As a result, the country was not informed about progress and decisions at the
summit. This suggests that the media play an essential role in bilateral diplomacy and
foreign policy as a messenger for the government, helping the policy-makers gain
national support for their decisions. In this position, the media serve as a marketing agent
for the government. To establish this further, I discuss national dissent on the issue to
demonstrate the environment in which media emerged as an important and independent
contributor that helped shape the government’s policy. I then address the role of media in
this atmosphere of widespread political disagreement. I draw from primary research by
analyzing selected materials and then placing this analysis in context of the real time
events, parliamentary debates and responses from the government. Based on these
findings, I suggest that there was significant national dissent in India on the topic of the
Agra Summit.
Dissent
The Agra Summit took place within a national political atmosphere of dissent.
Through this summit, the government switched from its policy of non-communication
toward Pakistan to an attempt to strengthen bilateral ties. As a result, the Indian leaders

Taneja 84

were subject to significant backlash from the opposition and other critics. While the
summit was organized primarily by the MEA, the opposition party (INC) voiced its
critiques through the media and in Parliament. Member of the INC, Bhatia raised the
following concern:
Sir, I would say that talks had miserably failed. It ignored the history. There was
no compulsion for you to go ahead and jump for talks while the situation in
Pakistan was not stable. ...You have always been saying that there will be no
dialogue with Pakistan unless cross-border terrorism is stopped. Prime Minister
said it; you said it a number of times and the Home Minister also said it. What
happened then that immediately, there was a U-turn in your foreign policy and
you went for talks? (Thirteenth Lok Sabha Debates, Session VII, 2001).
Bhatia pointed out that the independent national media had brought up this matter of
policy change multiple times, but the government chose to stay silent (Thirteenth Lok
Sabha Debates, Session VII, 2001). This suggests that the opposition paid attention to the
media’s reports. Given that parliamentary debates are top-level discussions that inform
policy, it is crucial to recognize the importance of the media when used as a reference
during these debates. This suggests that the opposition expected the government to
respond to policy issues flagged by the media, bringing the media into the policy
dialogue. Herein, we see the role of the media as an arbitrator between the government
and the opposition. Holding the government responsible for poor preparation for the
conference and for mismanagement of the media, the Samajwadi party and the INC came
together in their criticisms of the BJP-led NDA government (TOI 2001a). This highlights
that it wasn’t just the leading opposition that stood against the government’s actions, but
also other regional and national parties. The other parties of the NDA too questioned
BJP’s decision to engage with Pakistan. This issue exacerbated the alliance’s internal
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issues to the point that Shiv Sena19 considered breaking ties with the NDA in response to
BJP’s Pakistan-strategy (Mishra 2001). These reports suggest that various opposition
parties came together in the aftermath of Agra to voice their concerns about the
government’s decision to change India’s policy toward Pakistan, expressing their
disagreement both in Parliament and through the media. Former senior editor of TOI,
Shastri Ramachandran found that “had it not been for the Musharraf visit, the opposition
would neither have united against the Vajpayee government nor had an issue on which
they could speak in one voice” (Ramachandran 2001). This suggests that there
disagreement on various levels in the country—within the NDA, between political
parties, and between the media and the government. Amid this atmosphere of
disagreement, the various actors only agreed on the stand on Kashmir.
Vajpayee observed that the country and Parliament unanimously agreed that
future talks with Pakistan had to focus on a broader spectrum of bilateral improvements
and could not be limited to the conflict of Kashmir (Thirteenth Lok Sabha Debates,
Session VII, 2001). However, this consensus did not diminish the power of the
disagreement in the country that premised on change in government policy toward
Pakistan, ill-preparedness for the summit and poor management of the media.
Nonetheless, the following data illustrates that there was significant disagreement in
India.
The following pie chart and data exhibit national dissent, highlighting clear
opposition to the government’s actions. Among the 116 coded materials, there were 23
references to disagreement expressed in the country. Here, “dissent (cumulative)”
includes dissent from the opposition, critics and media. Similarly, “consensus
19

Shiv Sena is a far-right regional political party in India.
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(cumulative)” represents agreement on policy decisions expressed in parliament and in
the media. Among these, there were seven references (articles and parliamentary debates)
that expressed clear dissent from the opposition, while only one suggested opposition
support or consensus. The disagreement in the nation is evident in the pie chart that
spatially demonstrates the ratio of dissent (23 references) to consensus (3 references) in
the coded data. As this suggests, dissent was expressed more than five times as compared
to consensus. The cases of dissent, which are collectively drawn from 23 sources clearly
occupy significantly more space on the pie chart (orange) than the consensus nodes
which are referenced from only three sources. This confirms that there was widespread
disagreement between the various political actors in the nation.

Figure 3: National dissent during the Agra Summit
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Table 5: Summary of coding on national dissent during the Agra Summit
Nodes

Number of items coded

Dissent (Orange)

23

Consensus (Blue)

3

*Colors in brackets indicate the corresponding colors in the pie chart
This data and pie chart confirm that dissent was prevalent with regards to the
Agra. As previously mentioned, at this time, “India’s media management came in for
sharp criticism” (Baral 2002, 297). The summit led not only to widespread dissent from
the opposition, but also to a breakdown within the government’s alliance. As different
arguments surfaced from various political actors such as the Shiv Sena and the INC, the
media to emerged as an independent actor.
It is when there is such disagreement in the country that the media are able to
enter the debate on foreign policy with an independent stand. Chaudhuri explained that
opposition usually tries to look for issues that will create media hype. Especially in the
case of foreign policy, Chaudhuri finds that the government tend to keep the opposition
uniformed and outside the policy-making process. In such situations, the media step in as
an informant and arbitrator between the two actors (Chaudhuri 2017). We see this in the
case of the Agra Summit, demonstrated during the parliamentary debates. Member of the
INC, Priya Ranjan Dasmunsi raised the following question to Jaswant Singh in
parliament:
We were told by the media – we may be totally wrong – that at one stage, your
meeting with the Foreign Minister of Pakistan during the Summit almost clinched
the issue and finalised the draft but later on, it could not get through. Is it because
of the word, cross-border terrorism that they were not accepting or something
else? Could you just elaborate as to why after your understanding with their
Foreign Minister and the draft was ready, it could not get through? (Singh 2001)
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In stating that they were informed through the media, Munsi lays out the role of the
media as the arbitrator between the government and opposition in such foreign policy
matters. Here, the press serve as an expression of dissent—the platform that informs the
public and the government of the disagreement and concerns voiced by the critics and the
opposition. This analysis suggests that in cases of national disagreement and lack of
information, the media step in as a mediator between the government and the opposition.
As the government tries to sell its policy to the public through the media and the
opposition expresses disagreement through mass media, the media are able to develop an
important independent role, allowing them to frame the argument. This framing gives the
media the power to guide the public’s perception of the news. As previously discussed,
Baru identifies internal political dissent as a crucial factor leading to a “turning point” in
media’s role in foreign policy making. He identifies the following reason: “the gradual
erosion of the domestic political consensus on foreign policy, [gives] the media the role
of an arbiter and independent analyst of contending political views” (Baru 2009). Here,
one must note that Baru highlights the role of the media as an “independent analyst,”
suggesting that their function are able to emerge as a separate political actor on such
matters. Within this context, it is important to understand the capacity in which the
national media acts.
The Government and the Media
Both the government and the opposition acknowledged the media’s contribution
to and importance during the summit. Jaswant Singh recognized the issues brought up in
parliament, stating, “I had said that … there were three or four broad issues: preparation,
agenda and also the media” (Thirteenth Lok Sabha Debates, Session VII, 2001). By
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noting the importance of media management at the bilateral summit, Singh acknowledged
the role the media play within the governmental and policy-making system. He accepted
that the government had not been “perfect” in its management of the media (Thirteenth
Lok Sabha Debates, Session VII, 2001). This analysis suggests that the government
viewed the media as a tool to deliver their message to the country. In this, the government
credited the media with the role of the mediator. Here, it is important to recognize that
foreign policy is not limited to decisions made between the two governments. It extends
to the parliament, where the government must justify its actions to the opposition parties
and to the public. Within this scope, the government must maintain close ties with the
national media. Especially in the case of Pakistan that serves as much as a domestic
matter as a foreign one (Chaudhuri 2016; Sikri 2009, 38), the media is crucial due to the
interest of the public. In the post-summit materials, the government referred to the media
at least 16 times when discussing the Agra Summit. These references came up in six
different materials, detailed in the following image:
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Image 3: Government mention of the media in Parliamentary debates and news articles
Ten of these references appeared in the Lok Sabha debate, where the role of
media and the government’s inability to manage it were discussed extensively. This
suggests that the opposition and the government brought up the media multiple times
during one Lok Sabha debate, drawing attention to the importance of the media’s
contribution. This suggests that the policy-makers consider the media an important
political actor, worthy of discussion and deliberation. In addition, Prime Minister
Vajpayee mentioned in his statement in the Parliament that he had had discussed bilateral
relations with various leaders prior to Musharraf’s visit:
In the days and weeks before his visit, I had occasion to exchange views and
perspectives – individually and collectively – with leaders of political parties,
eminent personalities, media representatives and intellectuals, on the future
prospects for India-Pakistan relations (PM speech 2001).
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Here, Vajpayee highlights that media representatives were part of these policy
discussions. This confirms that they had a seat at the foreign-policy making table and
acknowledging their importance in this sphere. In addition, four news articles reported
the government’s take on media during the conference. One news article reported
Vajpayee as stating that there “should have been more contact with the media” (TOI
2001b). Others expressed a similar view. Yet again, this indicates that the government
acknowledged the need to regularly engage with the media regularly and to keep the
media informed. In another case, P.N. Dhar stated, “One thing that was new in this
summit was an element of negotiation through the media. The media played that role too
enthusiastically, which was not very helpful” (Khan 2001). Here, Dhar emphasizes that
Musharraf began a dialogue through the media, that put the media in the center of the
discussion. Musharraf used the media a as tool for garnering support among the public in
order to portray a positive image of Pakistan. With such power, the media retained the
power to frame the discussion surrounding the Agra Summit.
Role of the Media
The media extensively used framing and agenda setting strategies to emerge as an
independent actor amid the disagreement in the nation. The strategy of framing allows the
media to choose the lens or angle taken to present a story. This gives the media the power
to create “interpretive frames” (Gamson and Wolfsfeld 1993), consequently using
specific lenses, stereotypes and symbols to present news (Entman 1991). I identified 30
references to media framing in my empirical analysis of 112 news articles, indicating that
30 articles explicitly framed the story on Agra, presenting it through an anti-Pakistan lens
or an anti-BJP government one. I discuss how multiple articles presented the story from
Taneja 92

an angle tilted against the government’s judgement, suggesting that the BJP’s decisions
were immature. TOI journalist Ashish Ray said about BJP’s expectations from Pakistan
at the summit: “Without adequate preparation, five years of hostility had even less of a
chance of being undone in five hours of dialogue. It was surprising some (BJP leaders)
were gullible enough to think otherwise” (Ray 2001). Along similar lines, Manoj Joshi
wrote, “The government has not been able to synchronise its military policy with its
political goals. As a result the Indian effort looks whimsical and fitful” (Joshi 2001). Ray
and Joshi, along with others, framed their representation and analysis of the summit in the
media on the note of BJP’s immature decisions, thus directing how the public perceived
the summit and its outcomes.
In addition, some presented an anti-Pakistan lens in their articles, blaming
Musharraf’s restriction to the Kashmir issue for the breakdown in Agra and presenting
Pakistan in the light of its cross-border terrorism and incursions. Titles of articles read
“Hurriyat sings Musharraf’s tune” (TOI 2001c) and “Dawood leaves Pakistan to avoid
embarrassing Musharraf” (Balakrishnan 2001). Meanwhile, TOI editorials presented an
anti-Pakistan frame, heightened by their focus on a humanistic approach stressing that the
Kashmiris, prisoners of war and families of martyrs were forgotten in this dialogue. In
one editorial, TOI began, “Family members of the martyrs who made supreme sacrifice
while defending the nation against pakistan are hurt and angry over the failure of Agra
Summit” (TOI 2001d). Here, they call attention to the personal aspect of the summit,
encouraging readers to associate the summit with these ideas presented in the news. In
another editorial, TOI highlighted that the “Agra Summit is a good step, but no more than
a step,” (TOI 2001e). Noting that editorials are considered the voice of the newspaper,
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this analysis suggests that TOI too was driven to frame the story to incite public emotion
through a humanistic aspect. Further, they were hesitant about the summit and fostered a
pessimistic view of the summit among the public. In addition to this framing mechanism,
the news media flagged issues for the government’s attention and set out policy options
through their agenda setting function.
As for agenda setting, there are five references to such cases in news articles
where the media are calling the government’s attention to certain aspects of the IndiaPakistan relationship and setting out policy options for the government. In one article,
Joshi wrote, “A new strategy of operations must emphasize the use of well-equipped,
highly trained and disciplined forces to deal with militancy” (Joshi 2001). In another, Ray
suggested that “The best chance of a deal is with the Pakistan army. … army rule in
Pakistan is India’s best opportunity, as is BJP being in office for Pakistan” (Ray 2001).
Along similar lines, Kanak Mani Dixit wrote an opinion piece subtitled “Focus on
Cultural Affinity, Not Borders”. He laid out clear policy options, stating that at future
summits, the governments “must proceed with the work of future-building in South Asia.
For example, convert the killing glaciers of Siachen into an international peace park”
(Dixit 2001). In this manner, news articles, mostly opinion pieces set out certain policy
options for the government, encouraging them to focus on specific aspects of the issue—
setting the agenda.
Thus, media framing and agenda setting played an important role in the
representation of the Agra summit through an anti-Pakistan and an anti-BJP lens,
influencing the public and opposition’s perception of the summit. for the broader public
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and within the media-government engagement. This highlights the independent role of
the media in shaping the discourse surrounding the Agra Summit.

Conclusion

The Agra Summit, intended to strengthen bilateral ties between India and
Pakistan, resulted in a diplomatic impasse and was broadly deemed a failure. This made
room for extensive government criticism in India by the media and the opposition,
leading to internal dissent. Empirical analysis shows that this dissent in the nation
allowed the media to enter the dialogue as an important independent actor. As the
government tried to use the media to gain public support for its policy and the opposition
tried to employ the media to express disagreement, the media unintentionally emerged as
an independent actor arbitrating between the two sides. As such, they were able to
express their own opinions and guide the public and government agendas through
framing and agenda setting. Further, the media was able to frame the coverage of the
summit through interpretive lenses, primarily ones that were anti-Pakistan and critical of
the BJP. In addition, the media resorted to agenda setting, encouraging the government to
focus on certain aspects of the issue. Resultantly, the media came through as a crucial
independent actor during the Agra Summit and in its aftermath. Thus, the media helped
shape Indian foreign policy toward Pakistan by emphasizing the anti-Pakistan and antiBJP narrative, by offering policy options, and resultantly dictating the political climate
within which bilateral discussions were held. The case of the Agra Summit highlights that
national dissent allows the media to emerge as an independent political actor that helps
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shape foreign policy by mediating discussions, framing the news, and keeping the public
and the opposition apprized.

Taneja 96

Conclusion

This thesis traced how national media have shaped Indian foreign policy toward
Pakistan during two pivotal moments in their bilateral relations. By analyzing the role of
the media during the Kargil war of 1999 and the Agra Summit of 2001, I found that the
nature of the media’s role in the formulation of foreign policy is largely dependent on the
level of dissent on the issue among political actors in the nation. As the Kargil War was
marked by widespread consensus in the nation, the media acted in tandem with the
government, garnering public support for foreign policy decisions during this time. By
contrast, the Agra Summit was subject to significant disagreement in the country. As a
result, the media were able to emerge as an independent actor, arbitrating between the
government, opposition and the people. They were further able to present their own
analysis and opinion on the matter.
To date, there has been little research on this topic. Most scholars have studied
media strategies and foreign policy in a mutually exclusive framework. As described in
chapter 1, some have established the links between the media and public opinion within a
broader policy framework. However, only a handful of scholars have directly scrutinized
the links between the media and foreign policy. While Sanjaya Baru and Shruti Pandalai
offer some insights into this for the specific case of India, they both study media’s role in
context of India’s relations with a number of countries. The unique case of India-Pakistan
relations does not receive its due importance, warranted by the special bilateral relations
between these nations. Here, it is important to note that India’s foreign policy is
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especially ambiguous with regards to Pakistan, as explained in chapter 2. I note the
influence of public sensitivities and interest on India’s foreign policy toward Pakistan.
I return to my initial hypotheses: (1) News media emerge as a more important
actor in cases of national dissent than in cases of consensus, and (2) During times of
internal consensus, the media garner public support for government policy by echoing the
government’s voice and reiterating its decisions. To this end, the research I present
refutes my first hypothesis and proves the second one. My empirical analysis indicates
that the news media are not only important in times of national dissent, but also during
consensus. While the media serve crucial roles in both cases, the difference lies in the
nature of the media’s contribution. I show that the media emerge as a crucial independent
actor during times of dissent. As such, they present opinions that are not directly
affiliated with other actors. Further, by controlling the dissemination of information in the
country, they frame coverage so as to guide public perception of the event and determine
the government’s agenda. This leads me to my second hypothesis which is confirmed by
the findings presented here. As this hypothesis suggests, the media unite the nation in
support of the government in times of consensus. Here, as the interlocutor between the
government, the opposition, and the public, the media play a pivotal role in garnering
public support for the government. In this position, they both express the consensus that
exists within political actors, and expand it by manufacturing consent among the public.
Here, I acknowledge that the media do not work in isolation of the nation’s political
system; as previously mentioned, they are influenced by the elites and executives of the
country, and by the owners and editors of the news agencies. Thus, they are not
completely autonomous actors. However, for the purpose of this thesis, I focus on the
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outcome of the media’s role in the formulation of foreign policy. Hence, while more
knowledge on the influence of such actors would be informative, it is unlikely to alter my
findings. The following figure details the media’s contribution in cases of dissent and
consensus.

Figure 4: Role of the media depending on the extent of national consensus
Nonetheless, it is difficult to compare their level of importance in both these
situations. Rather, it is safe to infer that they are significant in both situations and are able
to contribute to and shape foreign policy. Hence, by offering in-depth research on the
India-Pakistan case through analysis of both diplomatic negotiations during the Agra
Summit and cross-border warfare in Kargil, this thesis contributes an original analysis of
media and foreign policy to the existing scholarship. I used a system of categorization of
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materials—news articles, government statements, and parliamentary debates—through
coding, to identify trends in media’s role during these events. For this, I coded 116 items
for the Agra Summit and 16 for the Kargil War. I identified the usage of media strategies
such as framing, agenda setting, and manufacturing consent. I also noted the
government’s interaction with the media, and built a comprehensive analysis based on
these findings. In so doing, this thesis has paved the way for further research on
government-media interactions.

Government-Media Relations: Acknowledging the Media’s Contribution

We see foreign policy as an elite discourse, orchestrated and implemented by toplevel government officials. Within the Indian context, this ranges from the prime minister
to the members of the MEA. Noting that not all foreign policy information is available to
the public, it is crucial to explore how the government makes note of the media’s role in
the formulation and implication of its policies. Thus, when the decision-makers
themselves credit the media for contributing to their work and for fabricating the
domestic environment within which they create policies, one can begin to understand the
relationship between the government and the media. Ambassador Cameron Munter
argued that the media are responsible for determining the atmosphere within which IndiaPakistan diplomacy exists (Munter 2016). This suggests that the media are able to drive
public opinion and dialogue to determine how policies are made and received in the
nations. Former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh expressed this following the Kargil
War: “It would be no exaggeration, therefore, to say that the role of the electronic and the
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print media, in fully informing and mobilizing public opinion, was an invaluable part of
the total national effort to meet the challenge of Kargil” (Singh 1999). Here, Singh
reiterated that the media were able to share the information from Kargil with the people
and unite the nation against a common rival. As such, the media extended the war to
make it a national issue accessible to and involving everyone in the country. It is with this
help of the media that the government was able to carry out its action during the war.
This reinforces the idea that the media are able to shape policy by creating the
environment within which policies are made and bilateral relations exist. Similarly, the
government and opposition acknowledged the media’s role with regards to the Agra
Summit as well. In this case, the government noted that they hadn’t given the media
adequate attention during the summit, highlighting that they recognized the importance of
the media’s role to promote their policy in the nation. Thus, as discussed in chapter 3 and
4, the government avowed the media’s contribution to the formulation of foreign policy
in both situations.
This analysis indicates the importance of government-media relations. Noting that
the media are responsible for taking the government’s message to the public and for
garnering public support, it is crucial to accredit the media with their role as arbitrators.
Further, in cases of dissent, the media’s ability to contribute independent perspectives and
mobilize the public is important for engaging the public in discussions on the nation’s
foreign policy. As the communication channel between the government and the public,
the media also play a crucial role in determining the extent of public support for the
government’s policies. The media do this through the strategies of media framing, agenda
setting and manufacturing consent, detailed in the first chapter. As such, one cannot
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ignore the “obvious and independent role of media” in driving public opinion in relation
to foreign policy matters in a democracy (Baru 2009, 279). Hence, studying the
intersection of these strategies and foreign policy allows us to better understand how the
government and media cooperate with each other in a democracy like India where public
opinion is important and the media are powerful. This is especially so in the case of
relations with Pakistan. However, it is then important to investigate whether the role of
the media is as significant in the formulation of Indian foreign policy toward countries
other than Pakistan.

Thinking Beyond Pakistan

As past hostilities between India and Pakistan have extended into present-day
mistrust and territorial disputes, Pakistan presents a unique challenge for Indian
policymakers. This calls my attention to the following question: Would the media’s role
in shaping foreign policy be as significant for countries other than Pakistan? Here, it is
important to reiterate two important factors. First, India-Pakistan relations are
emotionally bound by widespread public interest; and second, while India lacks a longterm foreign policy strategy in general, this problem is exacerbated in the case of
Pakistan (Sikri 2009, 39). This is evident in India’s unstable policies toward Pakistan.
The Indian government embraced a policy of non-communication following the Kargil
War in 1999 and declared that it would it would only engage with Pakistan once the latter
mitigated issues of cross-border terrorism and incursions. However, in 2001, the
Vajpayee government unexpectedly switched to high-level diplomacy leading to the Agra
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Summit (Dixit 2001, 136). Then, following the 2008 terror attacks in Mumbai, the
government returned to its policy of not communicating with Pakistan once again
(Bhushan 2009). With reference to inconclusive policy, Ambassador Sikri wrote, “India’s
policy towards Pakistan has oscillated like a pendulum” (Sikri 2009, 39). This suggests
that India has been unable to establish and adhere to a concrete foreign policy toward its
neighbour. However, India’s policies toward other countries are relatively more
structured and less prone to ambivalence.
Unlike in the case of Pakistan, public sentiments are significantly less charged
with respect to other countries, clearly removing them from the realm of domestic
matters. To this end, it can be said Pakistan is both a domestic and foreign policy issue
(Pandalai 2017; Sikri 2009, 38). Here, I reiterate that this is especially important since the
public’s news appetite is primarily for coverage on domestic issues (Hook 2016, 270).
Hence, it is likely that media would play a less conspicuous role in shaping foreign policy
toward other countries. For instance, the India-China border is subject to strictly enforced
laws, leaving little room for discourse by outside actors such as the media. Therefore, the
media had little room to enter the debate and contribute or shape the policy. Instead, they
offered intermittent coverage and primarily supported government decisions (Pandalai
2003, 59). On the other hand, during the Indo-US nuclear deal of 2008, the media were
heavily involved since the public and opposition were engaged in the dialogue. Since the
Indian policy was not concrete and the prime minister needed to earn the nation’s vote of
confidence to ensure that he was acting in favor of the people’s desires. This indicates
that the country was prone to dissent at this time, allowing the media were able to add to
the ongoing debate and play the serve as an opinion-generator and feedback mechanism
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(Panadali 2003, 44-50). This suggests that media’s contribution is dependent on a variety
of factors such as the ambivalence of government policy, domestic dissent on the issue,
and public sensitivities and interest. These factors are heightened in the case of Pakistan,
as noted in this thesis. Baru suggests that this means “any news about the US or Pakistan
is almost always front page and headline stuff, while news about most other developing
countries makes no waves” (Baru 2009, 282). However, this does not mean that the
media are insignificant in cases relating to other countries. Depending on the
circumstances of domestic consensus and interest, the media are still be able to contribute
to Indian foreign policy toward other countries. However, the nature and level of this
contribution varies from case to case. Nonetheless, no other country would fall within the
realm of domestic issues as does Pakistan, so the level of interest and influence of public
opinion are likely to be lower. Based on this research, I present the following
recommendations to enhance the media’s contribution to the policy process.

Recommendations

While the government of India has acknowledged the role of the media, there
remain issues that diminish the foreign policy outcomes that the two institutions could
achieve by working more cohesively and cooperatively. Here, recognizing that the media
serve as the main source of information and mediation between the government,
opposition and public, I offer suggestions that could help strengthen consensus in the
nation with regards to foreign policy. Drawing from the research on the ambiguous nature
of Indian foreign policy and its impact on India’s relations within South Asia, I suggest
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that the government could instead better leverage the media to garner public support and
build national consensus in their favor. By doing so, the government could bring the
nation together on foreign policy issues that could then allow the nation to develop
stronger international relations through a coherent and stable policy. Here, I acknowledge
that the government-public communication network has expanded and strengthened
under the leadership of Prime Minister Modi who launched the weekly radio show Mann
ki Baat (narendramodi.in). The show airs on the national radio channel and on
Doordarshan and is a one-hour session hosted by the prime minister in which he speaks
to the people of the nation. Even so, the government’s interaction with the media has not
significantly improved. On the contrary, the government’s engagement with the media
has decreased under Modi (Pandalai 2017; Bengali 2016). Based on these findings, I
present the following recommendations to strengthen government-media relations for a
more cohesive foreign policy strategy.
Strengthening the Government’s Media Networks
The Indian government lacks a notable government-media network comparable to
the United Kingdom’s British Broadcasting Company (BBC). Currently, there is one
government-owned public TV channel Doordarshan and no such newspaper. Although
Doordarshan reaches approximately 400 million viewers (BBC 2015), it is not
considered nearly as credible as the private channels (Malone et. al 2010). As such, it is
difficult for the government to convey its message to the public without the media’s
filter. Although Lok Sabha TV (LSTV) and Rajya Sabha TV (RSTV)20 are parliament
television channels tasked with broadcasting all parliamentary debates and procedures,
they do not effectively bridge the gap in government-public communication since the
20

The information on RSTV and LSTV presented here is drawn from their official websites.
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public continues to rely on private networks for the news. Thus, strengthening the
government-owned media network would allow the government to tackle this problem by
maintaining direct contact with the people. Simultaneously, the private media network
will be able to uphold the ideals of free speech and opinion by presenting independent
views. This would make for a strong structure for dissemination of information, ensuring
that the nation receives unfiltered news from the government, supplemented by opinions
and ideas presented by the experts of private news agencies. This is especially important
for the progress of foreign policy, since the media are the only source of information for
the public in this regard. Given that foreign policy does not affect the everyday lives of
citizens, the masses are disconnected from its intricacies and would benefit from
receiving information directly from the government.
Increasing Participation of Media Personnel in Government Institutions
Foreign editor Pramit Pal Chaudhuri was invited to be a member of the National
Security Advisory Board owing to his experience in foreign affairs journalism. Along the
same lines, Chairperson and Editorial Director of the Hindustan Times Group, Shobhana
Bhartia was nominated to the Rajya Sabha21 as an eminent person in social service. Both
these cases suggest that the government does try to involve distinguished media
personnel in the decision-making processes to draw from their expertise. In addition,
these experiences allow the journalists and leading media persons to gain direct
experience with the government and parliamentary procedures, enhancing their
understanding of the political and policy procedures. I suggest that an expansion and
strengthening of such direct government-media relationships could further benefit both
21

The President nominates 12 members to the Rajya Sabha. These members are nominated based on their
eminence in fields including arts, science, and social service.
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institutions. The media would benefit from direct exposure to governmental insights.
Simultaneously, it would work to the government’s advantage to have a well-informed
national news network that understands the intricacies of policy-making and works
alongside the government. The journalists would be privy to the sensitivity of foreign
affairs and more equipped with the necessary information to adequately present foreign
news stories. Within this scope, I believe that it would be beneficial to have individuals
from the media sphere more actively integrated with foreign policy-related matters from
within the government.

Research Prospects

This research is merely a first step, paving the way for more detailed and
explorative analysis on how the national media shape India’s foreign policy. Due to the
time constraints and the limited access to resources, I was only able to access 13 articles
from TOI and HT for the Kargil war. It would be beneficial to expand the research to a
broader base of media archives. However, for the purpose of this research, this was
feasible since I focused on articles available from the archives of the parliament library,
accounting for my material selection.
Nonetheless, it would be beneficial to expand the research to a broader timeframe so as to build a stronger temporal study. Ideally, I would begin with the 1971
Bangladesh Liberation War and end with the 2008 attacks in Mumbai. Since the 1971
war was the last India-Pakistan war before privatization of media, it would allow for a
comparison with a time when the main source of information for the public was
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government-owned. At this time, the public did not have access to non-stop coverage at
the time. As for the 2008 attacks, these marked a pivotal point in bilateral relations.
Following this incident, news media set out policy options for the government
compelling it to reconsider interacting with Pakistan (Pandalai 2013, 39). This is
especially important for media analysis since it marked the rise of the English news
channel TIMES NOW, when reporter Arnab Goswami used the opportunity not just to
evoke anti-Pakistan sentiments, but also to deconstruct the Indian government’s case
(Chaudhuri 2017). From then on, while there have been border skirmishes, these have not
been of the scale or consequence as the mentioned events. As for the present moment,
India and Pakistan have been involved in serious border conflict since the death of
Burhan Wani in July 2016, a renowned separatist leader in Kashmir (Anand and Kumar
2016). However, since these events are ongoing and are constantly marked by changing
policies and decisions, it is difficult to analyze them accurately. Thus, the temporal
research framework ranging from 1971 to 2008 could offer greater insights, building on a
temporal framework. It would then include media coverage of a terror attack as well, thus
encompassing the main issues of bilateral relations--cross-border terrorism, territorial
disputes, and diplomatic negotiations. There are still other ways to expand this study.
It would be valuable to build the research as a comparison of the different ruling
parties in India—INC and BJP. The incidents covered in this thesis were both under the
leadership of BJP’s Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee. Extending this to include cases
under the leadership of INC would be beneficial as it would allow us to analyze the links
between the media and the government with relation to foreign affairs under the different
leaders. Further, it would make for an interesting analysis to compare former cases with
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the current scenario under the Modi government. As demonstrated in chapter 1, this is
often seen as the new phase of foreign policy-making in India; under the “Modi
Doctrine” the government-public interaction has also undergone serious changes (Bengali
2016). Hence, it is important to study how the media contribute to foreign policy under
the Modi government. Further, a crucial extension would be a similar analysis of the case
from Pakistan’s viewpoint. This would involve looking at Pakistani media and
government sources to construct a similar research and to then compare the two cases.
This could reveal interesting findings especially when noting if the two governments
interact with their national media differently, and subsequently studying the role of the
media.
Lastly, one cannot deny that the broadcast and social media play a central role in
this age of information. As such, it would be beneficial to build a study that is able to
look at all these different forms of media so as to both compare them and analyze them as
a singular unit. Nonetheless, this thesis has established a framework for analysis of the
media’s contribution to India’s foreign policy toward Pakistan. At the outset, this was a
challenging task, taking into account the difficulty of isolating the role of the media and
analyzing media sources. However, despite the initial issues, this thesis was able to trace
the involvement of the media and has paved the way for future research on this topic that
could significantly inform our perspective of government-media relations and domestic
media’s contribution to the formulation of foreign policy. This could then help the Indian
government to better gauge how to leverage the media for its benefit in order to
strengthen the nation’s unity in matters of foreign policy.
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